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RECAPITALIZATIONS UNDER SECTION 3(a)(9) OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
J. William Hicks*
The Securities Act of 19331 requires that all securities sold ininterstate commerce 2 be registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) unless the security or transaction is ex-
empted. Section 3(a)(9) of that Act exempts from this registration
requirement 3 certain bona fide recapitalizations, 4 specifically,
[a]ny security exchanged by the issuer with its existing securityholders exclusively where no commission or other renumeration ispaid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange.'
Determining which transactions qualify under the Section 3(a) (9)
exemption has often been difficult' sinice its legislative history is
0 1975 by J. William Hicks
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
Section 2(7) of the Act defines "interstate commerce" as "trade or commerce in securities
or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the several States ... " 15
U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1970).
3The exemption provided by Section 3(a)(9) applies only to the registration requirements
of Section 5 of the Act. The antifraud and civil liability provisions of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§77q, 771(2) (1970), respectively, remain applicable if the issuer utilizes the requisite jurisdic-
tional means, see note 2 supra.
As used in this article, the term "recapitalization" has a meaning different from that
associated with the term "reorganization." A "reorganization" is a term of art under thefederal tax laws and refers to transactions involving two or more companies. See INT. Rv.CODE OF 1954 §§ 354-68. A "recapitalization," on the other hand, is a reshuffling of the capital
structure of a corporation or other business entity within the framework of the existing entity.Technically, most of the exchanges that are effected under Section 3(a)(9) are recapitaliza-
tions.
5 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1970). See generally H. BLOOmENTHAL, SEcuRTuES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 4.06, at 4-42.25 (1975); 1 L. Loss, SECURTIEs REGULATION 573-84 (2d ed.
1961); 4 id. 2596-97 (Supp. 1969); H. SowARDs, FEDERAL SECUurnEs Acr § 3.10, at 3-18 (1974).
6 This uncertainty has carried with it some serious consequences for those contemplating
recapitalizations without registering their plans. An issuer who misuses any exemption under
the Act, including Section 3(a)(9), is subject to one or more administrative sanctions. TheSEC can (1) seek an injunction to prohibit further sales of securities until a registration
statement is filed, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); (2) require disclosure of the issuer's contingentliability, id. § 771(1), with respect to those securities already sold in violation of Section 5;(3) insist on an offer of rescission and redemption for all securities sold illegally; and (4)
recommend criminal prosecution to the Justice Department, id. § 77x. The irresolutionsgenerally in Section 3(a)(9) have been offset somewhat by the availability of SEC staff
advisory opinions in private pre-transaction correspondence, but such opinions are confined
to the precise facts as stated in the future issuer's inquiry.
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sparse, 7 judicial interpretation virtually non-existent,' and, until
recently, administrative guidelines rather limited.' Some of the un-
certainty surrounding the exchange exemption, as Section 3(a) (9) is
sometimes called,"0 has now disappeared with changes in SEC pro-
cedures regarding its interpretative advice and its so-called no-
action letters." Since December 1, 1970, the SEC has opened for
See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). See also note 18 infra. See generally
Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 89, 96-102 (1937); Sargent, Questionable Uses of the "Exchange" Exemption
to Securities Registration: A Caveat, 44 VA. L. Rav. 703 (1958).
1 Judicial interpretation of Section 3(a)(9) has been limited to the case of Reserve Life Ins.
Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
See text accompanying note 89 infra. See also dictum in Browning Debenture Holders'
Comm. v. DASA Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 95,071 (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 1975).
1 The SEC to date has issued the following releases on Section 3(a)(9): SEC Securities Act
Release No. 646 (February 3, 1936), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 2136; SEC Securities Act
Release No. 2029 (August 8, 1939), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2140; The Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SaC. L. RaP. 76,539 (August 12, 1957). And it has promulgated two rules that apply to
Section 3(a)(9) transactions: Rule 149, 17 C.F.R. § 230.149 (1974), and Rule 150, id. § 230,150
(1974), both of which are discussed in the text accompanying note 106 infra. Finally, the
Commission has interpreted the section in Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111
(1940).
11 The exemption under Section 3(a)(9) is also occasionally referred to as the voluntary
exchange exemption. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 573.
11 Prior to December 1970, neither SEC interpretative letters, no-action letters, nor the
inquiries upon which they were based were generally available to the public. The staff ad-
hered to this policy of confidentiality for several reasons. (1) A member of the public, it was
felt, deserved the right to obtain the advice of the staff "without fear that information
provided to the staff for that purpose might be made public in a manner that might adversely
affect his lawful business activities or invade his personal privacy." SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4924, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,606 at 83,294
(September 20, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Release 4924]. (2) The staff feared that untimely
disclosure of certain information contained in such letters might "prejudice the interest of
others and in some instances could have an unwarranted impact upon the public securities
markets." Id. (3) Public disclosure might cause undue significance to be attributed to the
positions reflected in no-action letters and interpretive letters "by persons overlooking the
context in which they were given, particularly if all relevant facts are not included or policy
considerations are not articulated." Id. (4) Under a policy of public disclosure, "[slome
persons also might not appreciate the fact that not all no-action letters reflect an interpreta-
tion of the statute or rules, since in some instances no interpretation is involved but merely
the expression of a judgment with respect to enforcement policy." Id.
On September 20, 1968, the Commission requested comments as to whether its policy of
non-disclosure should be changed. Id. at 83,295. The overwhelming majority of responses
favored some form of public disclosure of the matters treated in no-action and interpretative
letters, and the Commission responded with a formal proposal, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5073, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,838 (July 14, 1970), which
was adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5098, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. RaP. 77,921 (October 29, 1970).
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public inspection the correspondence between persons who seek offi-
cial opinions regarding the application of federal securities law to
contemplated transactions and SEC'staff members who render such
legal interpretations 12 or who state, alternatively, that the staff will
not recommend enforcement action if the transaction is consum-
mated in the manner contemplated.13 During the past four and a
half years, many of these requests and staff responses have related
to Section 3(a)(9). 14
This article will examine Section 3(a)(9), its traditional interpre-
tations, and the "informal policy" 5 reflected in SEC staff interpre-
tative letters and no-action letters. Part I considers some of the
12 "Interpretative letters" is the term used by the SEC for the informal advice rendered
by Commission staff members to the public.
1 A no-action letter may, in fact, be an interpretation of the statute; most often, how-
ever, it is something entirely different. It may be a policy decision in a particular case,
after considering the priorities and problems before the agency, the manpower avail-
able [and] the effects on the public . . . .whether it is necessary to crank up a pro-
ceedingif someone should proceed in the manner suggested.
Release 4924, supra note 11, at 83,294 n.3, citing Panel Discussion, Public Information Act
and Interpretative and Advisory Rulings, 20 AD. L. REV. 1, 24 (1967). The SEC staff response
will occasionally state the narrow scope of its position. See, e.g., Pacesetter Financial Corp.,
[1974] CCH SEC "No ACTION" L'rras, roll 2, frame 01618, 01619 (January 23, 1974), where
the staff agreed that Section 3(a)(9) applied to the facts outlined in the letter of inquiry but
added, "Further, this letter only expresses the Division's position on enforcement action and
does not purport to express any legal conclusion on the questions presented"; Midwest Stock
Exchange Serv. Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,657 at 83,775
(December 27, 1973), where the staff cautioned the issuer, "We should emphasize that the
foregoing position [concurring in the availability of Section 3(a)(9)] is limited to the Securi-
ties Act aspects of your proposal. Before implementing the proposal, you should discuss the
Securities Exchange Act aspects with our Division of Market Regulation."
11 Commerce Clearing House has reproduced on microfilm, entitled CCH SEC "No
AcMION" Larrms [hereinafter cited as "No ACMION" LarramS], all the no-action letters and
interpretative letters made available by the Commission for public inspection. According to
this correspondence, the following number of requests for staff response relating to Section
3(a)(9) have been answered since 1971:





1975 6 (as of February, 1975)
Is According to Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, ". . .some of the most important law of
the SEC is embodied in this batch of no-action letters. This is law. The interpretations are
law." Release 4924, supra note 11, at 83,294, citing Panel Discussion, supra note 13, at 29.
After quoting from Professor Davis' statement, the SEC replied, "While the Commission does
not agree that this much significance should be attached to views expressed by the staff, it
may nevertheless be true that practitioners might find these letters helpful . . . ." Release
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permissible uses 6 of the exemption. Part II focuses on some specific
interpretative problems that it raises. Finally, Part II assesses the
wisdom of the present exemption in view of the Commission's recent
efforts to coordinate and integrate a continuous disclosure system
with the various exemptive provisions provided by the federal secur-
ities laws.
I. VARIOUS USES OF THE SECTION 3(a)(9) EXEMPTION
The legislative history of Section 3(a)(9) is closely tied to that of
Section 3(a)(10),"1 which provides an exemption for securities ex-
changed in the process of reorganization under the supervision of a
court or an appropriate administrative agency. 8 Both exemptions
reflect a legislative concern for the financially troubled issuer who
is attempting an internal readjustment without complying with the
expensive registration requirements of the 1933 Act. The Section
3(a)(9) exemption specifically has been seen as resting
on a balancing of interests between the corporation and its security
holders, and to indicate a recognition that the burden of delay and
expense involved in registration might well be disproportionately
4924, supra note 11, at 83,294. For a critical analysis of the Commission's informal method
of modifying substantive law through the publication of no-action responses, see Lowenfels,
SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing Statutes, Cases, and Commission Releases,
59 VA. L. REv. 303 (1973).
"1 In all of the no-action letters cited in Part I of this article, the SEC staff concurred in
the opinion of counsel for the issuer that a Section 3(a)(9) exemption was available. But such
letters have limited precedential value. See note 13 supra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970).
,8 An early draft of Section 3(a)(9) in fact allowed the exemption where the company
exchanged securities (or securities and cash) for the claims of its creditors. S. 875, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 12(d) (1933); H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(d) (1933). In the course of
redrafting the language, the Senate and House each passed different bills which would have
exempted intracorporate readjustments only in cases where they were effected under court
supervision. As finally adopted by Congress, the Securities Act of 1933 included Section 4(3),
which retained the language as to readjustments under court supervision but further ex-
empted
...[the] issuance of a security of a person exchanged by it with its existing security
holders exclusively, where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given di-
rectly or indirectly in connection with such exchange.
When the Act was amended in 1934, this provision was replaced by Section 3(a)(9) in its
present form. Congress repositioned the exchange exemption to rest under Section 3 in order
to codify an interpretation of Section 5(c) rendered by the Federal Trade Commission that
securities exempted on original issuance by Section 5(c) would retain that exemption when
in the hands of dealers. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934).
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heavy in a purely intracorporate readjustment where the very fact of
the readjustment would tend in the majority of instances to indicate
an embarrassed financial condition. In such cases, it may be sup-
posed, the interest of the security holders in being afforded full infor-
mation as to the corporate affairs is made to yield to their interest,
in common with the issuer itself, in expeditious and economical read-
justment.'9
This balancing rationale has not, however, limited the permissi-
ble scope of the provision. If Section 3(a) (9) were designed primarily
for recapitalizations by issuers in "an embarrassed financial condi-
tion," SEC interpretations of it would have probably so limited its
use. In fact, no such constraints exist. A review of pertinent no-
action letters indicates a variety of motivations for exempting re-
capitalizations and an assortment of techniques for accomplishing
them. The financial status of the issuers involved, whether a source
of embarrassment or pride, does not, in fact, affect availability of
exemption. 0
A. Reasons for an Exchange
The importance of Section 3(a)(9) to an issuer can be demon-
strated by illustration. Where corporation A has two classes of se-
curities issued and outstanding, common and preferred stock, and
decides to retire all of its preferred for one or more of the reasons
discussed below, it might well prefer to do so without disturbing its
cash reserve, instead offering an exchange of the old security for a
new one. For example, A might offer each holder of its preferred
" Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at 98.
Professor Loss believes that the following excerpt from the conference report indicates
that Section 3(a)(9) "may represent little more than a horse-trade compromise between the
two houses," 1 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 573.
The House provision . . . exempting . . . the sale of stock to stockholders is omitted
from the substitute . . . . Sales of stock to stockholders become subject to the Act
unless the stockholders are so small in number that the sale to them does not constitute
a public offering. The Senate agreed that the mere exchange with its security holders
of one form of security for another by an issuer where no commission or other remuner-
ation is paid, shall be exempt. This exemption is considered necessary to permit
certain voluntary readjustment of obligations. Inasmuch as any exchange that involves
the payment of a commission of any sort is not exempt, there is no danger of the
provision being used for purposes of evasion.
H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933). It should be noted that in fact Section
3(a)(9) may very well not be available to an issuer involved in bankruptcy. See text accompa-
nying note 103 infra.
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stock the opportunity to exchange that security for two shares of
common stock. Although a holder of A preferred stock could reject
the offer and remain a preferred stockholder, the more attractive the
exchange terms, the more difficult rejection would become. Since
corporation A's recapitalization plan involves an offer and sale of a
security,21 A common for A preferred, registration of the common
stock will be required unless an exemption exists. Section 3(a)(9)
can offer corporation A the exemption it desires. 22
Issuers embark on exempted recapitalizations under Section
3(a)(9) for various reasons, including the following.
1. To Comply with Contractual Obligations
An issuer may face a legal obligation to exchange one type of its
securities for another. 2 This obligation could arise from an agree-
ment with the holders of its securities establishing the terms of the
original issuance of the security and the option of subsequent ex-
change or redemption. For example, company B has issued and
outstanding 200,000 shares of common stock and 50,000 shares of
convertible preferred. Later, the board of directors of company B
authorizes the issuance and sale of 10,000 convertible subordinate
debentures. The terms of sale of the B convertible subordinate
21 A threshhold question in any exchange of securities is whether the transaction will be
deemed the sale of a new security. If the new security represents a material change from the
old one, the transaction will usually be treated as a sale. It is not clear, however, what position
the SEC staff will take if the new security is not significantly different from the old one, or if
the new one adds to and does not detract from the rights of the holders of the old securities,
In Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. RFP. 95,071
(S.D.N.Y. April 16, 1975), the issuer offered to reduce the conversion price of its debentures
-an action which the staff contended was a "sale" by the issuer, without the required
registration of a new security. When subsequently litigated, the court decided otherwise,
emphasizing that the necessary indenture amendments would be beneficial to the debenture
holders. Id. at 97,754.
The requests for no-action treatment under Section 3(a)(9) suggest that some counsel
assume a "sale" and structure their transactions within the limitations of the exemption. See,
e.g., notes 33-35 infra.
11 As noted, Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide certain specific exemptions from the
registration requirement of Section 5. While the heading for Section 3, "[e]xempted securi-
ties," suggests that all the securities included under it are exempt per se, only securities
covered by Sections 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) are so treated. Sections 3(a)(1), 3(a)(9), 3(a)(10),
3(a)(11), and 3(b) are, in reality, transactional exemptions, treated like those listed under
Section 4. This distinction between exempt securities and exempt transactions has special
significance for those selling securities in non-issuer transactions. See text accompanying note
144 infra for a discussion of resales of securities received by security holders in a Section
3(a)(9) exchange.
See text accompanying notes 42-53 infra.
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debentures may require company B to exchange one of its securities
for another.
A contractual obligation to exchange securities can also arise
under the terms of a merger agreement. Assume, for example, that
company C proposes to merge company X into C's wholly-owned
subsidiary, company CC.24 Company X has outstanding at the time
of the proposed merger $5,185,000 principal amount of certain con-
vertible debentures. As part of the merger agreement, company CC,
the subsidiary, agrees to assume the primary obligation to repay on
these convertible debentures of company X, and company C, the
parent, agrees to guarantee that obligation. Furthermore, the de-
bentures will now be convertible into shares of company C, after
adjusting the original conversion price to conform to the exchange
ratio which governs the merger. Company C will look to Section
3(a) (9) to exempt the issuance of its common stock upon conversion
of the debentures.
2. To Eliminate Outstanding Securities
An issuer might also consider an exchange under Section 3(a)(9)
because it wants to eliminate certain outstanding securities. Elimi-
nation of an entire class of securities might be desirable where (a)
they handicap the issuer with their burdensome interest,2 5
dividend,26 or redemption 27 rights; (b) they carry an artificial price
since without a market no reasonable basis exists for computing
their value;28 (c) the issuer wants to replace debt securities with
24 See Downe Communications, Inc., [1973] "No AcmON" LErrFE, roll 6, frame 10565
(May 2, 1973); Greater Jersey Bancorp., [1972] "No AcTION" Lrrs, roll 4, frame 05788
(March 15, 1972). A recapitalization involving a merger raises a special problem under Sec-
tion 3(a)(9) that is discussed in text accompanying note 72 infra.
25 See, e.g., Decraform, Inc., [1973] "No ACMION" LErrERS, roll 5, frame 08813 (May 1,
1973).
" See, e.g., Diverse-Graphics, Inc., [1972] "No-ACrON" LErrmRs, roll 7, frame 11465
(June 20, 1972). But see text accompanying note 110 infra.
21 See, e.g., Four-Phase Systems, Inc., [1973] "No ArTION L'rrFns, roll 12, frame 20368
(November 8, 1973).
21 See, e.g., USM Corp., [1973] "No ACTMON" LErrs, roll 5, frame 08807 (April 27, 1973),
discussed in note 75 infra. Cf. Knoxell Corp., [1972] "No AcTMON" LEnanS, roll 11, frame
17521 (October 24, 1972), where the issuer had two classes of common stock. Most of the
issuer's common stock was nonvoting, class B, for which a trading market existed. Since there
was little class A voting common stock, holders had difficulty selling it, other than to the
company itself. To provide a market for the class A common stock, the issuer proposed a
charter amendment granting holders of class A common stock an option to exchange on a
share-for-share basis an equivalent number-of shares of class B. The SEC staff agreed with
1975] 1063
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common stock to broaden its equity base;29 (d) the issuer wishes to
replace equity with debt in a "going private" transaction; (e) future
financing hinges on the retirement or liquidation of certain securi-
ties;3 or (f) the overhang of a conversion privilege on certain securi-
ties adversely affects the market price of the underlying security.
3. To Revitalize Outstanding Securities
Changes in business or in the economy or the psychology of the
securities markets could prompt an issuer to modify the terms of
some of its outstanding securities.31 For instance, assume that cor-
poration D has issued 3,000 five-year warrants and 200,000 shares
of common stock. Each warrant entitles the holder to acquire one
share of D common stock at an exercise price of $12 per share.
Although D common was trading at $11 per share when the warrants
were sold, the bid price in the over-the-counter market for D com-
mon stock has now leveled off at $8 per share with little hope for a
major upturn in the foreseeable future. Since warrant holders are
unlikely to exercise their warrant right in such circumstances, the
issuer might consider decreasing the exercise price of its warrants
to reflect more closely the market value of its common stock.32 An
counsel that the 3(a)(9) exemption would apply to the exchange.
21 See, e.g., Graphic Arts Center, Inc., [1974] "No AcTION" LErrERs, roll 8, frame 10928
(July 22, 1974), in which the issuer planned to offer to the trustees of its employee profit-
sharing plan a maximum of 65,000 shares of common stock in exchange for certain notes of
the issuer held by the trust. The exchange was proposed as a result of requests from employee
participants in the profit-sharing plan, who wanted to acquire equity ownership in the corpo-
ration. See also Midwest Stock Exchange Serv. Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,657 (December 27, 1973).
1 See, e.g., Canrad Precision Indus., Inc., [1973] "No ACrION" LMrrERs, roll 10, frame
17562 (August 28, 1973) (letter of corp. counsel) (Dividend arrearages on preferred stock
"make it difficult for Canrad to obtain favorable financing."); Wright Air Lines Inc., [1973]
"No ACTMON" LETRs, roll 9, frame 16134 (August 23, 1973) (exchange was a condition
precedent to an arrangement with issuer's principal creditor for the refinancing of issuer's
indebtedness); American Electronic Laboratories, Inc., [1972] "No AcnON" LMrrEas, roll 4,
frame 05777, 05781 (March 3, 1972) (letter of corp. counsel) (Warrants rendered valueless by
market price of underlying security could "possibly impair the Company's future ability to
raise capital.").
1' See, e.g., Peabody Galion Corp., [1973] "No AcTION" LETERS, roll 9, frame 16129
(August 16, 1973); Earth Sciences, Inc., [1972] "No ActON" LmrrERS, roll 9, frame 14881
(August 20, 1972) (warrant "split"); Magic Marker Corp., [1971] "No ACTION" LgrrEas, roll
4, frame 08150 (June 30, 1971).
31 At least two factors would prompt such a decision. First, corporation D's future ability
to raise capital through offerings of its securities in the public market might be impaired if
it allows present warrants to become valueless. See, e.g., American Electronic Laboratories,
1064
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issuer could accomplish the same result by increasing the interest
rate33 or by extending the term34 or maturity date.3 5
4. To Reduce Taxes
The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that the
expiration of unexercised warrants for which consideration has been
received creates ordinary income to the issuer to the extent of such
consideration." Faced with this prospect, an issuer might wish to
extend the expiration date of its outstanding warrants. 7 If extended
warrants are exchanged for the warrants about to expire, an issuer
at least gains valuable time. And it may avoid the tax entirely if the
warrant holders exercise all their rights prior to the new expiration
date.
5. To Maintain Control
Finally, insurgent stockholders or outsiders anxious to wrest con-
trol can pose a threat to management. Incumbents, so challenged,
may find a safe harbor in recapitalization. This defensive tactic was
utilized in 1971 by IBI Security Service, Inc., a corporation with
700,000 shares of outstanding common stock which was traded on
the over-the-counter market. The founders of IBI, hoping to
Inc., supra note 30. Second, with a more realistic exercise price corporation D might raise
additional funds if its common stock appreciates sufficiently to induce warrant holders to
exercise their new warrants. See, e.g., Instruments Sys. Corp., [1973] "No AcTiON" LErrERs,
roll 2, frame 01796 (January 24, 1973). Cf. Colorado Cent. Mines, Inc., [1972] "No ACTION"
Lm'rms, roll 5, frame 07352 (March 28, 1972), where the exercise price on the new warrants
was higher than that on the existing ones.
3 See, e.g., Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc., [1972] "No ACTION" LgrrERs, roll 11, frame 17514
(October 12, 1972).
' See, e.g., Magic Marker Corp., supra note 31.
33 See, e.g., Peabody Galion Corp., supra note 31.
31 See INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954 § 1234; Treas. Reg. § 1.1234-1(b) (1975). Additional problems
can arise if the issuer of unexercised warrants is a registered real estate investment trust
("REIT"). The expiration of such warrants could result in the receipt of substantial income
by a REIT in the year the warrants expire which would not qualify as REIT income for
purposes of federal income taxes. This in turn could preclude the trust from qualifying as a
REIT for tax purposes during that year, thereby resulting in severe adverse tax and cash flow
consequences. See Citinational Dev. Trust, [1975] "No AciON" LErrS, roll 2, frame 01198
(January 2, 1975), where Section 3(a)(9) was used to exempt an exchange of new warrants
for the outstanding warrants of a RE1T to avoid such tax consequences.
11 See, e.g., American Electronic Laboratories, Inc., supra note 30, at frame 05781 (letter
of corp. counsel); Unicare Services, Inc., [1974] "No ACTION" LETTERS, roll 8, frame 10935,
10938 (July 22, 1974) (letter of corp. counsel).
3 BI Security Servs., Inc., [1971] "No ACMON" LsrrERs, roll 6, frame 12621 (August 3,
1971).
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protect their voting control and guard against expensive take-over
bids, proposed a recapitalization by which two new classes of com-
mon stock, A and B, would be authorized by charter amendment
and exchanged under Section 3(a)(9) for the outstanding common.
Class A common, with one vote per share, was to be issued to those
security holders of IBI not among the original investors. Class B
common, with 11 votes per share, was to be issued to the insiders
and their families and was convertible into Class A common pur-
suant to the terms of the reorganization agreement. Such disparity
in voting rights was expected to assure the insiders continued con-
trol of their company. 9
B. Method of Exchange
A recapitalization under Section 3(a)(9) will take the form of
either an exchange offer or an exchange agreement.
1. Exchange Offer
An exchange offer by an issuer presents two choices to an offeree.
He can reject the offer and continue holding the outstanding secu-
rity, or he can accept the issuer's offer and become the holder of a
new security. Given the statutory purpose behind the federal securi-
ties laws of ensuring informed investment decisions by the public,
it is important to see whether and when a Section 3(a)(9) exemption
for an exchange offer would jeopardize meaningful investor choice.
If the outstanding security is valueless, the holder's choice does not
really involve an investment decision, although tax considerations
may pertain. The holder of a warrant, for instance, with an exercise
price significantly higher than the market price of the underlying
security and with an imminent expiration date is unlikely to balk
at an exchange that offers a new warrant with a lower exercise price
and an extended expiration date, especially when the exchange in-
volves no cost to him. But an investment decision is required of the
I Id. at frame 12624. The IBI exchange offer involved a potential conflict of interest, since
those who were instrumental in effecting the plan of reorganization were the very ones with
the most to gain. Proxy materials explaining the purpose and consequence of the plan were
to be sent to the IBI stockholders since the plan was subject to their approval at the annual
meeting. Id. at frame 12623. The SEC staff was, no doubt, aware of the special problems in
disclosure, and cautioned counsel for IBI that "Section 17 of the Securities Act as well as




outstanding security holder in at least two situations, and where the
exchange is effected pursuant to Section 3(a)(9) disclosure of infor-
mation that could assist an offeree in making his choice correctly is
unrequired.
In the more obvious case, if the outstanding security has any
value, the exchange offer will force the offeree to evaluate the rela-
tive merits of the securities involved. In the other case where the
outstanding security is valueless, an issuer can still place the offeree
in a position of making an investment decision by extending simul-
taneous offers." Such a difficult investment decision was faced in
1974 by the common stockholders of Charan Industries, Inc.,4" even
though its common stock was not without value. Charan proposed
an exchange of non-convertible subordinated debentures for its out-
standing common stock to be made simultaneously with an offer to
accept tenders of common stock for a cash amount less than that
to be used in computing the exchange ratio in the exchange offer.
Section 3(a) (9) was available to exempt the exchange from 1933 Act
disclosure.
2. Exchange Agreement
Alternatively, recapitalizations can be accomplished through an
exchange agreement, which reduces or eliminates the uncertainty
necessarily present when management presents security holders
with the decision to accept or reject an exchange offer. Three differ-
ent forms of exchange agreement have been used in connection with
Section 3(a)(9).
40 Cf. Canrad Precision Indus., Inc., supra note 30, for an example of simultaneous offers
in a charter amendment where the outstanding security had lost some of its value. Canrad
had three classes of securities outstanding: common stock, 6 percent cumulative convertible
junior preferred, and 7 percent cumulative convertible senior preferred. Both classes of pre-
ferred stock were convertible into common at $7.50 per share, but none had been converted
since the common stock was trading in the range of $2.50 to $3.00 per share. The board of
directors decided to modify or eliminate both classes of outstanding preferred by offering the
preferred stockholders an opportunity, contingent upon the.approval by two-thirds of the
preferred stockholders, either to exchange their existing preferred stock for a new class of
preferred which would provide for non-cumulative dividends and be convertible at the more
favorable price of $6.00 per share of common stock or simply to adjust the conversion price
of existing preferred from $7.50 to $6.00, subject to the stockholders' agreeing to convert their
stock immediately. Section 3(a)(9) was available to exempt Canrad from registration require-
ments under either option.
1 Charan Indus., Inc., [1974] "No ACTMON" LETTRrS, roll 2, frame 01623 (January 29,
1974).
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a. Redemption Agreement
As noted earlier, when originally issuing securities, the corpora-
tion may obligate itself to exchange that class for another that has
been or will be issued. The terms of the original stock purchase
agreement,42 merger agreement,43 repurchase contract,44 or other
understanding" will, of course, dictate the circumstances under
which the exchange occurs.
b. Charter or Contract Amendment
The terms delineating the relationship between an issuer and its
security holders might not include such an authorization for an
exchange of securities. But an exchange might later be authorized
by security holders' amendment of the issuer's charter4" or the con-
tract under which the securities were originally issued." After either
such amendment, a dissenting security holder might be forced to
surrender his original security for a new one issued in the recapitali-
zation. This type of involuntary exchange might have occurred in
the plan of Steiner American Corp.4" to reclassify its preferred stock
42 See,. e.g., Foster Wheeler Corp., [1973] "No ACTION" LmrrEs, roll 8, frame 14113 (July
2, 1973); Squibb Corp., [1971] "No ACTION" LErrERS, roll 4, frame 08144 (June 23, 1971).
43 See, e.g., Koch Indus., Inc., [1974] "No ACTION" LmrFM, roll 4, frame 05133 (March
6, 1974); Downe Communications, Inc., supra note 24; Greater Jersey Bancorp., supra note
24.
" See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp., [1974] "No AcTIoN" Lrrmrs roll 7, frame 09383 (May
31, 1974); Florida Tel. Corp., [1972] "No AcTIoN" LmrrERS, roll 10, frame 16090 (September
22, 1972); Bath Indus., Inc., [1971] "No ACTION" L'rrmas, roll 5, frame 10270 (July 21, 1971).
41 See, e.g., Cooky's Steak Pubs, Inc., [1972] "No ACTION" LmrrERs, roll 3, frame 03958
(February 18, 1972). Here, the issuer had 726,000 shares of common stock outstanding:
250,000 owned by the estate of a Mr. Shapiro; 250,000, by a Mr. Rachelson; and 226,000, by
some 900 other persons. The issuer entered into a redemption agreement with the estate, by
which the issuer was to redeem a maximum of 250,000 shares of common stock from its
shareholders in exchange for cash and non-negotiable notes. The agreement also provided
that Rachelson would tender none of his shares and that, if none of the minority shareholders
tendered their shares, then all of the estate's shares would be redeemed. However, if the
minority shareholders accepted the offer of redemption to the extent of more than 25,000
shares, then, at the estate's option, the redemption agreement could be cancelled and no
shares would be redeemed. If the minority stockholders accepted the offer of redemption to
the extent of 25,000 shares or less, or if the acceptances totalled more than 25,000 shares but
the estate decided not to cancel the agreement, then the number of shares to be redeemed
by the company from the estate would be reduced by the number of minority shares tendered
so that the total number of shares redeemed would not exceed 250,000 shares.
" See, e.g., Knoxell Corp., supra note 28.
" See, e.g., B.M.C. Indus. Inc., [1972] "No ACTION" LrrERs, roll 9, frame 14889 (August
30, 1972); Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc., supra note 33.
0 Steiner American Corp., [1973] "No ACTION" LrrEm, roll 5, frame 08791 (April 4,
1973).
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into shares of common, which would then be split on a 10-for-1
basis. Under the applicable state law, the amendment and resulting
recapitalization could have been authorized by the vote or written
consent of the holders of a majority of the common stock and of two-
thirds of the preferred stock outstanding.
c. Standby Agreement
A redemption standby agreement between an issuer and an in-
vestment banking firm can be combined with an exchange of securi-
ties under Section 3(a)(9).1 Suppose that corporation E proposes to
call in all of its $100 convertible debentures at a redemption price
of $105. The debentures are convertible into four shares of E com-
mon stock for each $100 of debentures, with the common stock
selling at approximately $30 per share and the debentures, conse-
quently, at approximately $120. Wishing to preserve its cash posi-
tion, corporation E hopes that its debenture holders will choose to
convert into common stock. But the issuer may be concerned about
an unanticipated decline in the market price of its common stock
between its notice of redemption and the redemption date, a period
usually of about 30 days. If the common stock during that period
dropped in value to $23 per share with a likely corresponding decline
in the market value of the debentures to $92, the debenture holder
would choose to redeem his debentures for cash rather than convert.
A standby agreement offers corporation E the protection it needs
against the risk of deteriorating conditions?0 The investment banker
11 See generally Schmults, Convertible Securities, Debentures, Warrants and Hybrid Se-
curities, Rule 155 Under the Securities Act of 1933, in PLI, FIRST ANNUAL INsTrrUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 207, 11-13 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleisher, Jr. eds. 1970); McDowell,
Rule lOb-7.: Stabilization, in PLI, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 155,
166-68 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. eds. 1971). The SEC's application of Section 3(a)(9)
to standby arrangements has drawn criticism. See Gadsby, Private Placement of Convertible
Securities, 15 Bus. LAW. 470, 490 n.59 (1960); Sargent, supra note 7, at 710-12.
0 In practically all standby arrangements, such as the one involving corporation E, if the
market price of the underlying security remains above the effective conversion price, virtually
no debentures will be tendered to the standby purchasers. Not surprisingly, the opposite is
true where the market price falls below the effective conversion price. In this situation, "the
purchasers [investment bankers or securities dealers] normally anticipate having to acquire
and convert virtually all of the outstanding debentures." Salomon Bros., [1972] "No
ACTION" LETTERS, roll 9, frame 14884, 14887 (August 29, 1972) (letter of corp. counsel).
51 A standby agreement between an issuer and an investment banker resembles an under-
writing agreement for a primary distribution of securities. Investment bankers usually retain
the right to stabilize, to overallot, and to offer the underlying securities to the public after
conversion. Purchases and sales for stabilization purposes must satisfy Rules 10b-6 and 10b-
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agrees,51 for a fee, 2 to purchase at a price slightly above the redemp-
tion price all of the debentures that are offered to it before the
redemption date and then to convert those debentures into the is-
suer's common stock, thus preserving the corporation's cash posi-
tion. The issuer may rely upon Section 3(a)(9) to exempt the ex-
change of its common stock for the debentures acquired by the
investment banker.5 3
C. Terms of Exchange
Regardless of the method employed in accomplishing a 3(a)(9)
exchange, an issuer may not require its security holders to part with
anything besides the issuer's own securities. 4 This limitation does
not apply, however, to the issuer, which may employ a variety of
inducements to realize a successful recapitalization. The most com-
mon exchange involves a single new security that may 5 or may not"5
7 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See McDowell, supra note 49, at 168. On the
other hand, the practice of overallotment (selling more shares than there are in the issuer to
ensure that the issue is all sold) may not fall within Rules 10b-6 or 10b-7, but the general
prohibitions against manipulation still apply. See id. For a discussion of resales by the
purchasers under a standby agreement, see text accompanying note 143 infra.
51 Methods for computing the compensation for the investment banker's services under a
standby agreement vary. See, e.g., Heublein, Inc., [1972] "No ACTION" LnrrzRs roll 6, frame
09604 (May 22, 1972) (issuer to pay standby purchasers a fee plus approximately $1.25 per
share for each share of common stock acquired on conversion in excess of an amount equal
to about 5 percent of the total number of shares into which the debentures were convertible);
American Broadcasting Cos., [1972] "No ACTION" LErTERS, roll 6, frame 09600 (May 15,
1972) (issuer to pay standby purchasers a fee of 0.7 percent of the principal amount of the
debentures outstanding on the last day preceding the giving of notice of redemption by the
issuer); Bath Indus., Inc., supra note 44 (issuer to pay 0.361/2 cents per share of cumulative
convertible preferred stock outstanding plus $2.31 for each preferred share purchased pur-
suant to the standby agreement in excess of 5 percent of the total outstanding).
0 See, e.g., Foster Wheeler Corp., supra note 42; Kewanee Oil Co., [1973] "No ACTION"
LETTERs, roll 3, frame 04119 (February 5, 1973).
51 See text following note 104 infra.
The security issued in the exchange might be identical to the outstanding security except
for those changes needed to revitalize the existing security for the reasons explained in note
32 supra. See note 21 supra.
m Neither Section 3(a)(9) itself nor administrative interpretations of it require that the
securities involved in the exchange have similar characteristics. Issuers have, in fact, struc-
tured their recapitalizations to include the following combinations of securities:
(1) Equity for equity. See, e.g., Tele-Metropol, Inc., [1973] "No ACTION" LMrERS, roll 10,
frame 17578 (September 21, 1973) (common for common); Foster Wheeler Corp., supra note
42 (common for cumulative convertible preferred); Equimark Corp., [1973] "No ACTION"
Lmrrsm, roll 3, frame 04127A (February 26, 1973) (common for preferred).
(2) Equity for debt. See, e.g., Wright Air Lines, Inc., supra note 30 (common for debenture);
Decraform Inc., supra note 25 (preferred for debenture); Infotronics Corp., [1972] "No
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resemble the outstanding security it would replace. But occasionally
an issuer's contribution to the exchange is a package consisting of
two or more different securities57 or a single security and cash."
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXEMPTION
Any issuer claiming the recapitalization exemption of Section
3(a) (9) must satisfy all of its requirements. The interpretative prob-
lems raised by each of these requirements are considered below.
A. Identity of Issuer
Section 3(a)(9) exempts any security exchanged by the issuer
with "its" security holders. The Commission has interpreted this
language as requiring that both the security issued and the security
surrendered in the exchange be those of the same issuer. 9 This
construction, which comports with the legislative history of the sec-
tion,6" does not hinder such obvious intra-corporate transactions as
AcrION" LETrERs, roll 4, frame 05784 (March 2, 1972) (common for note and warrant).(3) Debt for equity. See, e.g., Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., [1974] "No AcTION" LEmRs,
roll 10, frame 13488 (September 10, 1974)(convertible debenture for common); Charan Indus.,
Inc., supra note 41 (debenture for common).
(4) Debt for debt. See, e.g., Model Fin. Co., [1973] "No ACMbON" LE'rrs, roll 12, frame
02381 (November 27, 1973) (debenture for debenture).
"T See, e.g., WECO Dev. Corp., [1973] "No AMON" LrTTERS, roll 2, frame 01802 (January
24, 1973), where the recapitalization plan provided that convertible subordinated debenture
holders would be entitled upon conversion to acquire a unit consisting of one share of WECO
common and one WECO common stock purchase warrant. See also Midwest Stock Exchange
Serv. Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,657 (December 27,
1973). The issuer proposed a refinancing program designed to reduce long-term debt (by
eliminating most, if not all, withdrawal deposits) and to increase its equity base. The program
called for an increase in the number of authorized common shares through a stock split of
20-for-i, a contribution of $1 million by the Midwest Stock Exchange, its parent, and an
exchange offer under Section 3(a)(9) to each depositor-subscriber. Subscribers were permit-
ted to deposit a maximum of $75,000, in units of $3,000. Each unit entitled the participant
to receive a cash discount on certain fees charged by the issuer. The issuer also planned to
offer to each of the 52 depositor-subscribers an opportunity to exchange one $3,000 unit ofdeposit (there were 805 units outstanding) for one $1,500 principal amount "discount certifi-
cate" and 30 shares of its common stock. The certificates were to have a maturity date of
December 31, 1983, at which time the principal amount was due without interest and would
entitle each depositor to receive during the ten-year period a specified cash discount on the
service corporation's fees. Upon successful completion of the refinancing program, the parent
Midwest Stock Exchange would own approximately 80.5 percent of the outstanding common
stock of the issuer subsidiary.
See, e.g., USM Corp., supra note 28; Cooky's Steak Pubs, Inc., supra note 45.
' See releases cited in note 9 supra.
a This language ["exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holder"] does
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stock splits." But the availability of the exemption may be uncer-
tain in other situations.
1. Old Wine in a New Bottle
If an issuer with securities outstanding changes its legal form, issues
new securities in exchange for those outstanding, and continues its
original business, can it qualify as the "same issuer" for 3(a)(9)
purposes? The staff faced this issue in a no-action inquiry from
Cedar Point Oil and Gas Co. 2
On May 19, 1950, to facilitate the dissolution and liquidation of
the Salt Dome Oil Corp., all of its properties and assets were as-
signed in trust to the South Texas National Bank of Houston. The
bank was designated trustee, with the 3,500 stockholders of Salt
Dome becoming the trust beneficiaries. Subsequently, Salt Dome
was dissolved, certificates of beneficial interest were issued to
former stockholders, 3 and the bank continued to act as trustee pur-
suant to the term of the trust indenture. The life of the trust assets
was limited, and since the trustee was prohibited from acquiring
any new or additional properties, the trust was destined to eventual
termination. The trust indenture permitted a meeting of the certifi-
cate holders to be called by the trustee or by holders of not less than
five percent of the shares represented by the then outstanding certif-
icates for the purpose of considering disposition of the trust assets.
One certificate holder, eligible under the indenture to call such a
meeting, formed Cedar Point Oil and Gas Co. and intended to pro-
pose that all trust assets be transferred to Cedar Point in exchange
for Cedar.
not in terms require that the securities surrendered in exchange for the new securities
shall be securities of the same issuer, nor even that the exchange be one of security for
security, but merely that the transaction shall be by way of "exchange" and shall be
with persons who at the time of the exchange are security holders of the issuer of the
new securities. However, to give to the term "exchange" its broadest possible sense,
which might cover the issuance of securities for other species of property, or even for
cash, would clearly extend the operation of the section beyond its contemplated
bounds; and some limitation must therefore be found appropriate to the purpose
sought to be accomplished.
Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at 100.
61 For examples of permissible exchanges under Section 3(a)(9), see text following note 41
supra.
62 Cedar Point Oil & Gas Co., [1973] "No AcTioN" LTrERs roll 3, frame 04131A (February
27, 1973).
11 The certificates were publicly traded. Id.
[Vol. 61:10571072
Section 3(a)(9) Recapitalizations
Counsel for Cedar Point argued that Section 3(a)(9) would ex-
empt the exchange as "only the domicile of the entity is being
changed by the proposed transaction, with no new investment deci-
sion of certificate holders being involved."64 The staff disagreed,
however, and described the issuance of Cedar Point common stock
as "a registerable event which may be registered pursuant to Rule
145, if all of the requirements of that Rule are complied with, or on
Form S-1." The staff's position seems correct. When the stockhold-
ers acquired trust certificates, they could reasonably have contem-
plated a limited investment in a trust, supervised by a bank, that
would terminate upon the dissolution of the trust assets. They
should not be forced to decide whether to change their investment
status from beneficiaries under a trust to stockholders in a corpora-
tion without the disclosure protections of the Act.
Had the stockholders been fully informed of the trust reorganiza-
tion plans prior to receipt of their certificates, would the staff posi-
tion have been different? The staff's subsequent response to the
inquiry of the Recreation Ventures"6 suggests not. Recreation Ven-
tures was a limited partnership which had 774.60 limited partner-
ship interests outstanding, held by 113 partners. The partnership
was organized pursuant to an agreement which provided in detail
for its prospective reorganization into a different form. The limited
partners, upon joining the partnership, specifically agreed upon the
details of the new corporate form, including the state of incorpora-
tion, the form of the certificate of incorporation and by-laws, the
new ownership interests and the conditions for the reorganization.
Under the agreement, Recreation Ventures, as managing general
partner, would organize a new Delaware corporation with the con-
sent of holders of two-thirds of the limited partnership interest.
When so organized, all limited partners were required to exchange
their limited partnership interests, and all of the stockholders of the
general partners were required to exchange their stock for stock of
the new corporation. Furthermore, the likelihood of this recapitali-
zation had been disclosed in the final prospectus.67 The managing
" Id. at frame 04136 (letter of corp. counsel).
" Id. at frame 04132A.
" Recreation Ventures, [1973] "No ACMiON" LxrrEns, roll 5, frame 08798 (April 13, 1973).
In the registered offering of the limited partnership interests, the prospectus explained
that the partnership expected to propose the exchange when losses were no longer available
for deduction by limited partners or the financial requirements of the partnership dictated a
corporate rather than partnership form.
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general partner determined in 1973 that because losses were un-
likely to be available for deduction in that year, it would be appro-
priate to ask the holders of limited partnership interests for their
consent to the change. In claiming an exemption under Section
3(a)(9), counsel took the position that all partners had specifically
agreed to the recapitalization at the time of their original invest-
ment decisions.
The partners, therefore, were investing in an entity whose legal form
they agreed might change into a form in which their relative rights
and interests were known. In effect they agreed the Company
[partnership] and the Corporation were the same entity."
The staff response was brief and emphatic. The exemption was "not
available since [Section 3(a)(9)] requires that the securities to be
issued be of the same issuer as that received in the exchange. Such
is not the case in this instance." 9
The lesson from these and other no-action letters is obvious.
The staff's strict construction of Section 3(a)(9) when determining
issuer identity does not allow for exceptions based on policy"0 or
u Id. at frame 08804. Counsel for the partnership also asserted at any rate that the contem-
plated transaction should not be. considered in a class with the usual exchange offer, where a
new investment decision must be made on the terms of the offer. Id. (letter of corp. counsel).
Here, they argued, the investment decision was made at the time of investment in the
partnership, when the partners specifically agreed to the terms of the change with the sole
exception of the number of shares to be received.
Therefore, their investment decision upon purchasing a limited partnership interest
was also a decision to purchase a share or shares in the Corporation. In effect, in other
words, the partners agreed to accept an exchange subject only to the reaffirmation of
their consent. Therefore, their agreement now to accept the change of form of owner-
ship should not be considered the "sale" of a new security within the meaning of
Section 2(3) of the Act.
Id. at frame 08805 (letter of corp. counsel). To this argument, the staff simply stated that it
took the opposite position. Id. at frame 08799.
" Id. at frame 08799.
70 The no-action letter request by Niagara Frontier Transit Sys., Inc., [1975] "No-AcnON"
Lrrs, roll 1, frame 00200 (December 11, 1974) contemplated an exchange which from a
policy perspective would seem to have produced a sympathetic response from the staff.
Niagara had 318,886 shares of common stock outstanding which were held by approximately
1,425 shareholders. On March 29, 1974, at the company's last annual meeting of shareholders,
the shareholders authorized the sale of substantially all the assets of the company and
adopted a plan of complete liquidation pursuant to Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code.
On April 1, 1974, all of the operating assets of the company were sold to a public authority,
leaving primarily cash, certificates of deposit, and government securities.
Section 337 required the company to complete its liquidation by March 28, 1975, one year
after the adoption of the plan. In order to facilitate compliance, a provision of the plan
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authorized the company to make a liquidating cash distribution, not to exceed $5.00 per share
of outstanding common stock, in trust for its shareholders. One purpose of such a liquidating
trust was to provide funds to satisfy any liabilities of the shareholders, as transferees of the
company, which could not be ascertained accurately during dissolution. The principal rea-
son, however, was "that certain of the Company's federal and state tax returns have not yet
been audited and the Directors consider it necessary to make provision for the possible
payment of additional taxes, should they be assessed." Id. at frame 00205.
Pursuant to the plan, the company made a partial cash distribution to its shareholders in
the amount of $17.50 per share on May 31, 1974. As part of the final cash distribution to be
made prior to March 28, 1975, the company proposed to distribute to a liquidating trust the
equivalent of $4.75 per outstanding share of common stock. As a result, the shareholders were
to be issued, in conjunction with the final distribution of the company's assets, units of
beneficial interest on a pro rata basis. Corporate counsel argued that the exchange of certifi-
cates for units was exempt by reason of Section 3(a)(9) since both "represent only their
proportionate interest in the liquidation value of the net assets of the Company." Id. at frame
00208.
The staff disagreed because the company "would not be the issuer of the beneficial inter-
ests," id. at frame 00202, despite the following factors. (1) The plan provided that the terms
of the liquidating trust were subject to shareholder approval. The company had called a
special meeting of shareholders to approve the terms of the trust, to appoint a corporate
trustee and to elect a shareholder's committee to act on behalf of the shareholders in connec-
tion with the trust, and intended to solicit proxies with respect to that meeting. (2) The
liquidating trust funds could only be used for payment of liabilities of the shareholders, as
transferees of the company, or of trust expenses, or to the shareholders in a final cash distribu-
tion once all claims and expenses had been satisfied. The trust agreement was to provide that
with rcspect to such payments the trustee was to be directed by the shareholders' committee.
(3) No trading market would have developed in the units, as they were non-negotiable. (4)
The only purpose for the liquidating trust, which was to be the issuer of the units, was to
assure compliance with federal tax laws.
The staff has, however, used policy to support its narrow interpretation of Section 3(a)(9).
See, e.g., Kanawha Cauley Coal & Coke Co., [1974] "No ACTiON" LETrEras, roll 9, frame
12324 (August 5, 1974). The company was a West Virginia corporation having one class of
common stock with 5,174 shares outstanding. It did not mine coal; its only business consisted
of leasing its real estate. The company did not envision changing its basic activity of collect-
ing coal royalties from its properties and distributing the entire net profits to its stockholders.
For tax reasons, the company proposed changing its legal form from a corporation to a
limited partnership. A plan called for transfer of the assets to a limited partnership, formed
by the company, in exchange for participation interests as limited partners, each stockholder
exchanging one share of stock for one participation interest as either a general or limited
partner. There were to be no other limited or general partners. The percentage of ownership
of each stockholder would remain the same, and the general partners would not obtain any
increased economic benefit from or interest in the partnership. The capital of the business
was to remain the same. One critical difference between the two entities did exist. While the
limited partners would have the power to replace any general partner and appoint a successor,
the remaining general partners retained the ultimate power as general partners to decide
whether to continue the business and accept the appointee as a general partner.
Counsel for the company believed that Section 3(a)(9) provided an exemption for the
proposed exchange between the company and its stockholders since the proposed change in
the legal form of doing business would "not change the rights or economic interest of any
stockholders in the business." Id. at frame 12328. The staff concluded otherwise, stating that
the exemption was unavailable because of "the significant legal and practical effects upon
present stockholders [e.g., personal liability, tax exposure] that a change in the Company's
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contractual consent. The old wine must flow from the old bottle
itself.71
2. Assumption of Obligations
Interpretative problems also arise when the original issuer has
been merged out of existence and its obligations to outstanding
security holders assumed by the acquiring corporation." In such a
case, the question may arise as to who is the issuer of those original
securities for purposes of Section 3(a)(9).
This issue was raised in connection with a no-action letter request
by Heritage Bancorporation.73 In March 1969, the First National
Iron Bank of New Jersey issued $4 million in convertible notes due
in 1994 to seven purchasers in reliance on the bank registration
exemption in Section 3(a)(2).11 In November 1971, Heritage ac-
quired Iron Bank, assuming all liability and obligation on the notes
and making them convertible into common stock of its own. The
SEC granted the no-action request, which relied on Section 3(a)(9).
Although the notes were originally securities issued by Iron Bank,
the staff reasoned, the obligations ceased to exist upon merger, and
new securities with identical characteristics had been issued by Her-
itage when it assumed all liability and obligation on them. There-
fore, holders of the notes were considered Heritage's "existing secu-
rity holders."7 5 The section is also available in a straight subsidiary
form of business may have and because of the absence of an identity of issuers of the securities
to be exchanged as required by Section 3(a)(9)." Id. at frame 12324.
71 Even if the entity making the exchange offer has the same legal form as the entity that
issued the original securities, Section 3(a)(9) is available only if they are in fact the same
entities. See, e.g., Artistic & Leisuretime Prods., Inc., [1974] "No AcrION" LETrERS, roll 9,
frame 12330 (August 15, 1974). Artistic contemplated a plan in which it would become the
wholly-owned subsidiary of Great Northern, a corporation formed for this specific purpose.
The stockholders of Artistic would then exchange their shares for a like number of Great
Northern's shares. The staff refused to issue a no-action letter under Section 3(a)(9) since
"[tihe issuer in this instance (i.e., Great Northern) will be exchanging its shares, not with
its own security holders, but with the security holders of another entity (i.e., Artistic)." Id.
See also Grossbard Sec. Corp., [1973] "No ACTION" LrrTES, roll 5, frame 08795 (April 10,
1973).
72 Section 3(a)(9) does not exempt the exchange of securities under a merger agreement.
The merger transaction may qualify under another exemption or under Rule 145, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.145 (1973).
73 Heritage Bancorporation, [1973] "No ACTION" LErrmS, roll 2, frame 01793 (January 15,
1973).
71 Section 3(a)(2) exempts from the registration requirements of Section 5 securities issued
or guaranteed by a domestic governmental body or by a national or state bank. 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(2) (1970).
" See also USM Corp., supra note 28. In 1964 the shareholders of Nylock Corp. adopted a
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merger where the acquired corporation is merged into a subsidiary
of the acquiring corporation and the latter becomes the primary
obligor on outstanding obligations of the former.7 1
plan of complete liquidation and dissolution which provided for the transfer of its patents
and licenses to USM Corp. Under an agreement between Nylock and USM, the latter agreed
to pay Nylock shareholders, over a period of 25 years, 50 percent of the royalties from the
patents and licenses after first deducting $100,000 and expenses. Nylock shareholders re-
ceived as part of their liquidating dividend negotiable certificates evidencing this right to
receive future royalty payments from USM. Certificates representing 120,793 units of partici-pating interest in the payments were distributed through the aid of Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co. by Nylock to its shareholders upon liquidation in 1965 and were outstanding at the time
of the letter of inquiry to the SEC. A total of $11.47 per unit had been distributed, and the
certificates had been publicly traded.
Certificate holders, representing a substantial number of units, decided with USM to assign
a minimum value to each unit and to reduce or eliminate the certificates' remaining 16-year
life. Their plan called for USM to offer to acquire the certificates representing all of the
120,793 units originally distributed, but not less than 75 percent of all outstanding units, for$4.50 per unit plus the nonassignable right to receive continuous payments of a four-year
period equal to the royalty income which the certificate holder would have otherwise received.
Since USM expected to rely on Section 3(a)(9) for its exchange exemption, it had to
determine whether it or Nylock was the issuer of the outstanding certificates. Counsel for
USM argued that
holders of the Nylock Certificates should be considered to be USM's 'existing security
holders' solely for the purposes of permitting USM to acquire the Certificates upon the
terms referred to above in reliance on the exemption contained in section 3(a)(9) of
the Act without registering whatever document may evidence USM's obligation to
make royalty payments for an additional three years.
Id. at frame 08812 (letter of corp. counsel). The staff agreed and granted the requested no-
action letter.
7, See, e.g., WECO Dev. Corp., supra note 57. WECO planned to merge Petro-Dynamics,
Inc. into a wholly-owned subsidiary of WECO. Petro had outstanding a class of convertible
subordinate debentures which, under the terms of the proposed plan of recapitalization, were
to be convertible into shares of WECO common stock. WECO intended to execute a supple-
mental indenture with the indenture trustee under which WECO would assume the obliga-
tions under the Petro debentures and become the primary obligor. See also Pacesetter Fin.
Corp., supra note 13. Here, two different banks with certain convertible debt securities
outstanding formed Pacesetter as a holding company to acquire the two banks. Their plan
called for the creation of two phantom banks, wholly-owned subsidiaries of Pacesetter, which
would receive the two predecessor banks under the consolidation agreements. Each consolida-
tion agreement was to be a three-party contract under which Pacesetter would agree to issue
its common stock to the shareholders of the old bank pursuant to Rule 133. The phantom
bank-subsidiary and Pacesetter were to assume joint and several liability for the due payment
of the principal and interest of the convertible debt securities of the old bank and Pacesetter
was to agree to exchange its common upon any conversion of the debt securities.
For a discussion of the problems in availability of Section 3(a)(9) where the parent is not
the primary obligor, as in WECO, or jointly and severally liable, as in Pacesetter, but merely
guarantees an obligation of its subsidiary, see Downe Communications, Inc., supra note 24,
discussed in note 87 infra and accompanying text. See also Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at
101.
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A different result follows, however, in the reverse merger situa-
tion. Assume that corporation F and corporation G sign a merger
agreement requiring F to merge its wholly-owned subsidiary, corpo-
ration FF, into G which has issued common stock and convertible
debentures. Under the terms of the merger agreement, common
stock of F will be exchanged for all the G common, and G converti-
ble debentures will become convertible into F common. Upon con-
summation of the agreement, F will own G, FF will be merged into
G, and the former stockholders of G will be stockholders of F. But
what of the debentures originally issued by G? Although by virtue
of the merger they will become convertible into common stock of F,
they will remain G's securities since G still exists. In this situation
Section 3(a)(9) is unavailable to F when its common stock is issued
upon conversion.77
3. Guaranteed Obligations
The 1934 amendments to the Securities Act broadened the defini-
tion of a security to include guarantees7" and included a guarantor
as an "issuer."79 Thus, the presence of a guarantee in a transaction,
otherwise qualified under Section 3(a)(9), raises some troublesome
questions.80
The staff has had the occasion of a no-action request to consider
whether a guarantor may claim the underlying securities as his own
for the purposes of claiming an exemption under Section 3(a)(9) for
a subsequent exchange." National Can Corp.'s wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, National Can Overseas Corp., sold $7 million in bonds to
underwriters in England for resale exclusively outside the United
States, to persons other than American citizens or residents." Na-
tional, the parent, guaranteed the bonds as to principal and inter-
est, also making them convertible into shares of its own common
See generally Schmults, supra note 49, at 217.
7s Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 201, 48 Stat. 905, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
Id. § 201, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1970).
See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 574-75.
" National Can Corp., [1973] "No ACMION" LTTERs, roll 10, frame 17585 (September 28,
1973).
81 The bonds were not registered under the Act in reliance upon Registration of Foreign
Offerings by Domestic Issuers, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708, 1 CCH SEC. L. REP.
11 1361 (July 9, 1964), concerning exemption for a foreign sale of securities, discussed in note
150 infra.
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stock, so as to enable Overseas to obtain an acceptable interest rate.National claimed an exemption under Section 3(a)(9) for later issu-
ance of its common stock upon exercise of conversion rights by thebondholders,3 asserting that its unconditional guarantee of theprincipal and interest of Overseas' bonds transformed them into
securities of National. 4 The staff rejected this theory, responding:
Although the guarantee of Overseas' Bonds by National may in itselfbe deemed to be a security of National under Section 2(l) of the Act,
the Bonds themselves are not thereby considered a security of Na-
tional under this Section solely by reason of the guarantee. 5
Since the issuer of the bonds, Overseas, could not be described asdefunct or without substantial assets, holders of the guaranteed
bonds who chose to convert would have been required to part with
two valuable securities, each of a different issuer."6 Such a trans-
action could not satisfy the exemption's identity-of-issuer require-
ment.17
81 National had filed a registration statement on Form S-7 that covered a portion of theshares of National common stock issuable upon conversion of the outstanding bonds of Over-seas. Counsel for National was of the opinion that because an exemption existed underSection 3(a)(9), National had no obligation to keep in effect an updated prospectus coveringthe remaining shares to be issued upon conversion. National Can Corp., supra note 81, at
frame 17591.
s Id.
Id. at frame 17586.
The staff rejected National's request for a no-action letter on another ground as well. Thestaff was unwilling to permit the issuance of National's common stock without an updatedprospectus in view of "the likelihood that National's common stock will flow back into thehands of American investors since National's shares are currently traded on several U.S. stock
exchanges." Id.
" But cf. Downe Communications, Inc., supra note 24. Downe proposed to acquire BartellCorp. in compliance with Rule 145. Under the terms of the proposed merger agreement,Bartell was to be merged into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Downe. The Downe subsidiarywas to assume the primary obligation to repay on Bartell's outstanding convertible deben-tures. The parent corporation, Downe, was to guarantee these obligations but was not to bejointly and severally liable with its subsidiary on the debentures, which were to become
convertible into shares of Downe common stock.
Counsel for Downe argued that Section 3(a)(9) exempted the exchange of Downe commonto be issued upon conversion of Bartell debentures-assumed by Downe's subsidiary-eventhough Downe was not to become a primary obligor. In agreeing to issue a no-action letter,the staff took a position that appears inconsistent with earlier statements suggesting that aparent corporation's guarantee of payment would not qualify it as an issuer for purposes ofthe exemption. See, e.g., WECO Dev. Corp., supra note 57, where counsel for WECO had
apparently been advised that Section 3(a)(9) would be available only where that issuer be-
came the primary obligor on the acquired company's debentures. Id. (letter of corp. counsel)
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Still unresolved is the converse situation, where the request for
exemption comes from the issuer of the underlying security. There
are two possible plans in this regard. In the first, corporation H
offers to exchange its common stock for its outstanding debentures,
which are guaranteed by corporation I. Technically, the exchange
offer is not being made "by the issuer with its existing security
holders exclusively." H is asking its debenture holders to relinquish
H's debenture together with a separate "security," the guarantee of
a different issuer. But, if I's guarantee is worthless, either because I
is defunct or with substantially inadequate assets to honor its obli-
gation to H's debenture holders, form should yield to substance, as
suggested by the language of National Can, and the exemption
should apply. In the second situation, H offers to exchange new
debentures, guaranteed by I, for outstanding debentures that, in
this case, have carried no guarantee."8 Since 's guarantee is a sepa-
rate security of a different issuer, Section 3(a)(9) does not apply.
Disclosure of the guarantor's financial condition would aid in the
debenture holder's investment decision.
4. Voting Trusts
Renewal of a voting trust through issuance of new voting trust
certificates in exchange for the old could be viewed as a change of
issuer identity. The SEC advanced just this theory as amicus curiae
in Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Provident Life Insurance Co.,"
at frame 01803. The distinction seems to be the existence of an agreement between Downe
and its subsidiary under which Downe was to pay the debenture obligations and to reimburse
the subsidiary for any payments it might have to make under the debentures or the supple-
mental indenture. Downe Communications, Inc., supra note 24, at frame 10569.
11 According to one authority, Section 3(a)(9) would be available for H's exchange but not
for the issuance of !s guarantee. 1 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 575. Such an interpretation
seems to be sticking a bit close to the letter of the law in a case where the investor is
presumably "getting a break" - and to be basically inconsistent with the Commis-
sion's view [reflected in Rule 150] . . . which permits the issuer to offer cash along
with its new securities under the exemption.
Id. at 575. It would seem, however, that a security holder who is asked to accept a guarantee
of a different issuer, as part of the exchange package, is not in the same position as the
exchangee who is offered cash plus new securities. Consider the investor who is asked to
exchange his 6 percent subordinated notes for 4 percent subordinated notes guaranteed by a
different issuer. If the investor decides to relinquish the 2 percent annual return by accepting
the exchange offer, it will probably be because he believes the guarantee is equivalent to the
2 percent differential. Assuming that the 6 percent notes have value, the investor is required
to consider the financial prospects of two different issuers, one of which may be unknown to
him.
"499 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
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contending that Section 3(a)(9) did not exempt such an exchange.
Provident's management had joined with its stockholders in 1955 to
create a voting trust to stabilize control as a defensive measure
against corporate raids and take-overs. Provident filed a registration
statement for the voting trust certificates, and approximately 64
percent of its stockholders eventually joined the trust, depositing
their stock with the trustees and receiving voting trust certificates
in exchange. Prior to the scheduled expiration of the trust in 1970,
Provident's directors, as trustees of the voting trust, obtained per-
mission from the certificate holders to extend the trust for an addi-
tional 10 years, as permitted by the terms of the original instrument.
Neither the trustees nor Provident, itself, filed a registration state-
ment for the extended voting trust certificates. Meanwhile, Reserve
Insurance Co. and Midland Life Insurance Co., unsuccessful bid-
ders in a take-over attempt of Provident, brought suit to declare
invalid the trustees' actions in obtaining consents for the extension
of the voting trust and to require its dissolution - an action which
rested, in part, 0 on the federal law allegation that Provident had
issued securities in violation of the 1933 Act.
While Provident and the trustees argued that Section 3(a)(9) ex-
empted the exchange, Reserve, Midland, and the SEC in its amicus
brief" argued that the renewal of the voting trust and the resulting
issuance of amended certificates amounted to the issuance of a new
security by a new issuer, even though state law might characterize
both trusts as a single continuing entity." The rationale here was
that since trustees of the original trust could not compel any certifi-
cate holder to participate in extension, the trust terminated as an
" Reserve and Midland contended that Section 6 of the 1933 Act and Section 12 of the 1934Act required the filing of registration data, that the solicitation of consents to the extension
of the voting trust violated the SEC rules governing proxy solicitation, and that registration
was required in all the states in which solicitations were made by the trustees. Id. at 719.
,1 Brief for SEC Staff as Amicus Curiae, Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co.,499 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1974), summarized at [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 94,409.
11 The SEC staff brief responded to a suggestion that its position could imply a federal law
relating to voting trust extension. The staff recognized the preeminence of state law fordetermining whether and under what circumstances a voting trust might be extended, but it
argued that state law should not be considered relevant in determining whether securitiesissued in connection with the extension should be registered under the Act or exempt underSection 3(a)(9). That determination, it urged, turned only on the federal law meaning of the
terms "issuer" and "existing security holder" in Section 3(a)(9). Reply Memorandum of SECStaff as Amicus Curiae, Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., summarized at id.
94,433.
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entity in 1970. The Commission pointed to the beneficient purpose
of the Act in promoting full disclosure of information believed neces-
sary for informed investment decisions:
the § 3(a)(9) exemption ought to be construed narrowly in order to
protect investors such as the present holders of extended trust certifi-
cates who should be entitled to the same safeguards afforded share-
holders who contemplated exchanging shares for the original voting
trust certificate.
93
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's find-
ing that a single continuing trust existed and that the exchange of
securities thus fell within the meaning of Section 3(a)(9)." The
court stated, however, that it would have agreed with the SEC's
position had the 1955 voting trust not contained an express provi-
sion for extension. 5 The terms of the initial trust, the court rea-
soned, "added an element of flexibility to the initial 15-year time
period" and, when the parties first exchanged their shares of Provi-
dent stock for voting trust certificates, they "evidenced an intent to
participate in the voting trust arrangement for such time period as
might be reasonably necessary to protect against corporate raid-
ing."" The court noted that the following factors influenced its de-
termination: (1) the trustees solicited only the holders of existing
voting trust certificates; (2) the voting trust did not issue new certif-
icates but, rather, the trustees simply stamped the old ones with the
new trust termination date; (3) each certificate holder retained the
same equitable interest in the corporation as before; (4) the voting
trust itself was not materially altered except for its extension; and
(5) no remuneration was paid for soliciting the exchange.
The holding in Provident Life on the exchange exemption issue
seems correct in view of the district court's fact finding that the
decision to extend the life of the voting trust "was influenced in
part" by announced takeover attempts so that the original purpose
of the voting trust was furthered and the intention of its members
499 F.2d at 721-22.
" Id. at 722-23.
g5 The court noted, id. at 722 n.8, that two leading authorities on securities law believed
that Section 3(a)(9) covered an extension of a previously existing voting trust, when the
original trust agreement contained a provision for renewal and the other requirements of the
exchange exemption were met. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 574; H. SOWARDS, supra note
5, § 3.10 at 20-21 n.56.
93 499 F.2d at 722.
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satisfied. 7 On the other hand, had the trustees' decision to extend
the voting trust been predominately influenced by objectives not
originally contemplated by members of the initial trust, the decision
should properly have been treated as authorizing the creation of a
new voting trust with different objectives. In that event, the SEC's
argument becomes persuasive and the new and old trusts should be
considered separate legal entities under the Act."
5. Bankruptcy
Creditors of a bankrupt corporation frequently establish a special
committee, which itself can take the form of a corporation, to pur-
chase assets of the bankrupt. Holders of first lien mortgage real
estate bonds, for example, might incorporate as the most appropri-
ate means to dispose of a large, diversified piece of property owned
by the bankrupt. If the lien creditors then have their corporation
exchange its debentures or other securities for the bonds held by the
creditors-thereby leaving their new corporation as the principal or
only secured creditor to purchase the bankrupt's property in its
entirety-would the exchange of securities be exempt under Section
3(a)(9)?
In response to a no-action letter inquiry by O'Neill Bondholders
Committee,"9 the staff stated that the 3(a)(9) exemption did not
apply. The Committee, a group of creditors of a bankrupt which had
as its major asset a tract of land, contended that the liquidation of
the property parcel by parcel would have left no equity for the
general creditors and that if the various parcels were sold as one,
some equity might well remain for them. The Committee then
argued, inter alia, that Section 3(a) (9) exempted the exchange of its
debentures for the bonds of the bankrupt even though its new corpo-
ration was not the same issuer as the bankrupt. It attempted tojustify exemption by reconciling Section 3(a)(9) with certain special
principles of bankruptcy law:
,T Id. at 718.
" Provident Life should be compared with the staff's position in Recreation Ventures,
supra note 66, which also dealt with security holders who understood the nature of the issuer
and approved the future plans for its operation. In Provident Life, the legal form of the issuer(a voting trust) did not change; it simply continued to exist. In the recapitalization contem-
plated by Recreation Ventures, on the other hand, a limited partnership was to be trans-
formed into a corporation.
" O'Neill Bondholders Comm., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,947 (SEC July 10, 1974).
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[Ilt is our belief that such an implication [that two different issuers
are involved] overlooks one important consideration and rationale
behind the bankruptcy laws. This rationale is that the creditors of the
bankrupt in essence [step] into the shoes of the bankrupt. In other
words, it is our belief that the bankruptcy of O'Neill Enterprises, Inc.,
results in the secured bondholders on the Willoughby Tract in effect
taking the place of the bankrupt itself in its relationship to the se-
cured property, in that they become the equity holders as to this part
of the Bankrupt's property.' 0
The staff rejected the Committee's interpretation of 3(a) (9)'s "same
issuer" requirement, construing the exemption literally. It re-
sponded to the attempted statutory reconciliation in broad terms:
[W]e wish to point out that the reorganization chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act are drawn to effect the type of transaction you describe
and contain appropriate provisions for the protection of public inves-
tors and correlative exemptions from the registration provisions of the
Securities Act. In our view, the difficulties involved in the instant
situation appear to have been created by the use of a proceeding
which is not intended for the purpose you are attempting to accom-
plish. 01
Although this opinion was addressed to the specifics of the Commit-
tee inquiry, such a message, when read with earlier staff pronounce-
ments,"0 2 can be generalized: Section 3(a)(9) is narrowly construed
11 Id. at 84,443. Counsel for the O'Neill Bondholders Committee relied on Helvering v.
Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942), as authority for its position regarding
identity of issuers under Section 3(a)(9). The staff did not discuss this decision, although it
is distinguishable in any case. The issue involved there was the meaning of the term
"reorganization" in Section 112(i)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1928, as applied to an acquisition
of all of the assets of the bankrupt corporation. The Court held that it was immaterial that
the transfer shifted the ownership of the equity in the property from the stockholders to the
creditors of the old corporation, since effective equity ownership had already passed to the
creditors, who "stepped into the shoes of the old stockholders" when they "took steps to
enforce their demands against their insolvent debtor." Id. at 183-84. It is hard to justify
Alabama Asphaltic as supporting the O'Neill Bondholders' position that by assuming effec-
tive control of the bankrupt's property, their corporation could be considered "the same
issuer" as the bankrupt in issuing new debentures. Alabama Asphaltic was a tax case where
the consequences of an issuer identity determination were limited to a tax advantage or
disadvantage. In O'Neill, a determination as to identity of the issuers would essentially force
the bondholders of the bankrupt to make a hard investment decision without the disclosure
protection of the Securities Act or the special safeguards of the Bankruptcy Act.
0I O'Neill Bondholders Comm., supra note 99, at 84,440.
0 See, e.g., Sequential Information Sys., Inc., [1972] "No AcTIoN" LTERs, roll 12, frame
19103 (November 3, 1972); Seaferro, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
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in all cases; where an insolvent or bankrupt issuer is involved, the
exemption assumes an even narrower dimension.103
B. "Exclusively" by Exchange
The word "exclusively," appearing in the middle of Section
3(a)(9), modifies the phrase "existing security holders." This syntax
clearly establishes a requirement for exemption that the issue be
offered solely to the issuer's security holders. '04 But the term "exclu-
sively" signifies considerably more. SEC interpretation in effect
holds that it also modifies the requirement of exchange, that Section
3(a)(9) reads, "Any security exclusively exchanged by the issuer
with its existing security holders exclusively." The effect of this
second requirement of exclusivity is that security holders in a
3(a)(9) transaction may not be asked to part with anything other
than their old securities. If, for example, an issuer offers to exchange
new securities upon the security holder's exercise of warrants (thus
requiring cash payments), the exemption is not available."-
This prohibition is not absolute. Two limited exceptions to the
"clean exchange" requirement are found in the SEC's interpretative
rules. Rule 149 permits the security holder in a Section 3(a)(9) ex-
change to make whatever cash payments may be necessary "to ef-
fect an equitable adjustment, in respect of dividends or interest paid
or payable on the securities involved in the exchange, as between
such security holder and other security holders of the same class
accepting the offer of exchange." ' The second liberalizing interpre-
tation, Rule 150, allows the issuer to make payments to its security
REP. 1I 78,097 (SEC 1971).
103 See Sequential Information Sys., Inc., supra note 102, where the company proposed an
exchange of its securities for outstanding certificates of indebtedness issued and sold by the
company, as debtor in possession, during the proceeding for arrangement under Chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act. In denying the request for a no-action letter, the Chief Counsel stated:
The Division [of Corporation Finance] does not accept the suggestion that Sections
3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 provide an independent basis for the
exemptions you seek. . . . Both sections 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10) exclude public offerings
of securities to new investors and are limited to holders of preexisting investments. We,
therefore, regard Section 393 of the Bankruptcy Act as a specific application of the
previously enacted Securities Act exemptions to the Chapter XI context, and conclude
that, in Chapter XI proceedings, corresponding Securities Act exemptions must be
construed to conform to the more specific terms of Section 393.
Id. at frame 19105.
,04 See text accompanying notes 114-26 infra.
," See, e.g., The Bank of California, Nat'l Ass'n, [1972] "No ACMON" La'rrs, roll 5,
frame 07362 (April 18, 1972).
101 17 C.F.R. § 230.149 (1973).
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holders "in connection with an exchange of securities for outstand-
ing securities, when such payments are part of the terms of the offer
of exchange."'' ° In short, the security holders may not make cash
payments to the issuer' 8 except where necessary to achieve an "eq-
uitable adjustment"; but the issuer, for its part, is free to include
cash payments to its security holders.
The Commission's insistence on an exclusive exchange is cer-
tainly warranted for some recapitalizations. Assume, for example,
that corporation J has five stockholders, each owning five shares of
common stock and five shares of preferred stock purchased for a
total of $10,000 during the formative corporate stages. Later, each
stockholder purchased 10 debentures in the aggregate principal
amount of $10,000. A 3(a)(9) recapitalization is proposed, calling for
J to issue 3 additional shares of the common stock in exchange for
one debenture and $1,000 in cash. It is clear that, if exempt from
registration requirements, 's exchange offer would require each of
its five stockholders to make a hard investment decision without the
107 17 C.F.R. § 230.150 (1973). See, e.g., Steiner American Corp., supra note 48, where
the issuer relied upon Rule 150 for its planned payment of cash to security holders for the
dividend accruing to the date of reclassification. It has been noted that "[t]o the extent
that cash is paid by the issuer, the issuer is buying, rather than selling, securities." Throop.
& Lane, supra note 7, at 101 n.29 (emphasis in original). No attempt will be made here to
assess the potential problems for such an issuer under Rule 10b-6. But the staff has had at
least one occasion to respond to an inquiry about the applicability of that rule to a Section
3(a)(9) transaction. In a request by American Electronic Laboratories, Inc., supra note 30,
counsel for the issuer argued that the word "distribution," as used in Rule 10b-6, should be
defined so as "not to ensnare within its scope transactions which bear no relationship to
abuses which the rule was designed to prevent." Id. at frame 07360 (letter of corp. counsel).
The staff offered no response.
'" Rule 152A, 17 C.F.R. §230.152a (1973), which governs the offer or sale of certain frac-
tional interests, qualifies this requirement of an exclusive exchange, however, as shown by
Equimark Corp., supra note 56. The issuer, Equimark, had outstanding common and convert-
ible preferred stock, convertible into common at the conversion ratio of 4/ shares of common
for each share of preferred. Equimark planned to rely upon Section 3(a)(9) to exempt the
issuance of its common upon conversion of the preferred. Instead of issuing any fractional
shares or any other fractional interest which a holder of a preferred share might otherwise be
entitled to receive upon conversion, Equimark planned to make a cash payment to such
holders in an amount equal to the same fraction of the market price for such shares of common
stock, or a cash payment in an amount equal to the same fraction of the market value for
such other interest on the day such rights were exercised. Alternatively, it planned to offer
the holders of preferred stock the privilege of purchasing whatever fractional interest was
necessary to round off. The staff agreed with Equimark that Section 3(a)(9) was available
for the proposed exchange and that the proposed offer to the preferred stock holders to
purchase necessary fractional interests would be exempt under Section 4(1) and Rule 152A.
See generally 4 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 2627-29.
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benefit of the Act's disclosure protections. That difficulty alone, of
course, is an inadequate justification for denying the benefits of
Section 3(a)(9); as has been observed, use of the exemption is notlimited to those transactions where security holders possess detailed
information about the issuer."9 Disqualification arises here because
the issuance of 's new securities is not exclusively an "exchange"
but is in part a "sale." J essentially is soliciting its security holders
for another cash investment-exactly the sort of transaction which
the 1933 Act intended to protect by free disclosure.
The clean exchange requirement, however, becomes more diffi-
cult to justify the less the transaction involves a purchase and sale
of securities for cash and the more it approaches a security-for-
security exchange. Suppose, for example, that Jhad offered its secu-
rity holders the opportunity to acquire one share of common stock
in exchange for an outstanding debenture. If one share of J common
stock is worth less than one J debenture, is the debenture holder
who accepts S's exchange offer parting with something of value in
addition to the old security? Or, if J asks its security holders to
surrender one share of preferred stock and waive all unpaid accrued
dividends attributable to that share in exchange for two new shares
of preferred, is the exclusive exchange requirement under Section
3(a)(9) satisfied?'10
" Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at 97, citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1933).
10 In Diverse-Graphics, Inc., supra note 26, the staff granted a no-action letter on the basis
of Section 3(a)(9) where all unpaid accrued interest and dividends on preferred stock were to
be waived by security holders. See also Canrad Precision Indus., Inc., supra note 30, where
the staff agreed not to recommend that action be taken against an issuer who wished under
the protection of Section 3(a)(9) to modify or eliminate its outstanding preferred stock as a
result of exorbitant dividend arrearages. The proposed exchange offer was to give the pre-
ferred stockholders an opportunity either to exchange their existing preferred for a new class
of non-cumulative convertible preferred or to adjust the conversion price of existing shares
of preferred from $7.50 to $6.00, subject to the shareholders' agreeing to convert their shares
immediately. Cf. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., supra note 27, in which a no-action letter was again
granted to an issuer who proposed to exchange new preferred and common stock for old
preferred with arrearages. The staff characterized the settlement of the accrued cash divi-
dends with common stock as not the primary purpose of the exchange offer which was, rather,
to eliminate the substantial continuing burdens of the cash dividend and redemption provi-
sions of the old preferred. Id. at frame 20374. But cf. Masters Communications, Inc., [1971]
"No AcTrON" LErrTas, roll 1, frame 00891 (April 13, 1971), in which an individual stockholder
sought a no-action letter for a proposed unregistered sale of securities. In explaining how he
had acquired his shares, the stockholder described a "stock split" purportedly under Section
3(a) (9), in which all the security holders "forgave" certain debentures amounting to $105,000,
which were then cancelled by the issuer. The staff challenged the issuer's use of the exchange
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In each case, one could certainly argue that the security holder is
being asked not only to relinquish the old security but also implic-
itly to forego other valuable property.' Yet the preferable interpre-
tation would not disqualify every such exchange in which a security
holder's consideration includes the relinquishment of a right to re-
ceive or recover property from the issuer. Nothing in Section 3(a) (9),
or in the SEC's interpretation of it, limits its use to exchanges
involving clear economic equivalents.12 An issuer might decide to
offer its warrant holders new warrants with a greater market value
than those outstanding because the issuer wishes to retain the sup-
port and good will of all its security holders."' Similarly, a security
holder might decide to surrender a security that contains no voting
rights if the issuer is offering in exchange a security which has less
market value but possesses voting rights. A 3(a)(9) exchange con-
fronts participants with the same calculus of considerations present
in any bargain and exchange; as noted previously, difficulty of
choice on the part of the security holder will not make Section
3(a)(9) inapplicable.
Furthermore, waiver of unpaid accrued interest and dividends or
discharge of indebtedness will not add to potential investment
losses of the security holders. In the case of corporation J, each
stockholder has already invested $20,000. If J asks its security hold-
ers to accept three shares of common in exchange for one debenture
plus $1,000, each cooperating security holder who participates fully
in the exchange plan will be investing an additional $10,000 in a
business venture that could now result in a total loss for him of
$30,000. Such a recapitalization scheme should not be exempt from
registration. But if J asks its security holders to accept three shares
of preferred in exchange for one share of preferred and waiver of
accrued dividends, or makes the same offer for one debenture that
has a market value in excess of the combined value of three shares
exemption and refused to grant a no-action letter to the selling stockholder. See generally 1
L. Loss, supra note 5, at 576.
"I The Georgia securities act limits its recapitalization exemption to those recapitaliza-
tions "for which the recipient does not pay any consideration or surrender the right to a
distribution in cash or property other than such securities." GA. CODE ANN. §97-109(f) (Cum.
Supp. 1974).
"2 See, e.g., Wright Air Lines, Inc., supra note 30, where the issuer proposed to exchange
its common stock for subordinated notes that were in default and planned to rely upon
Section 3(a)(9). A no-action letter was granted.
"I See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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of stock, the security holder's exposure remains only $20,000. In
short, although disclosure might seem necessary regardless of the
consideration requested from a security holder, since otherwise it
becomes difficult to assess the post-exchange value of the invest-
ment package, under present interpretations of Section 3(a)(9) the
inquiry is only whether new consideration is moving from security
holders to the issuer, and not whether security holders have lost
something which they might have recovered from the issuer. Thus,
if an exchange offer requires a security holder to deliver his old
security and perform certain services for the benefit of the issuer,
Section 3(a)(9) would not be available. The security holder is not
being asked to make a cash investment, but he is being required to
contribute new consideration, presumably having a cash value, as
part of the exchange.
C. "Exclusively" with Security Holders
The 3(a)(9) exemption can apply only where an issuer's exchange
is limited to its security holders."4 The significance of this particular
requirement results from the comprehensive concept of an "issue."
Under certain circumstances, two or more apparently unrelated se-
curities offerings by an issuer will be viewed by the SEC or the
courts as integral parts of a single issue for Section 3(a)(9) pur-
poses. 5 Such a constructive integration of offerings may mean that
a prior or subsequent offering to persons who are not already secu-
rity holders of the issuer (even if made pursuant to a registration
statement or to an offering circular under Regulation A) will destroy
the exemption even though the principal offering is so limited.
Consider, for example, company K, which has an "open-end"
mortgage upon its properties that secures its only issue of bonds,
series A. K then proposes to create two new series of bonds, B and
C, under the same mortgage, in order to redeem the outstanding
series A bonds. The series B and C bonds will differ substantially
"' This does not mean, however, that an exchange offer must be extended to all of the
issuer's security holders or, even, to all members of a particular class. It means only that the
issue must be exchanged with some or all of the issuer's existing security holders. Such a
construction of the section, which does not contain the word "issue," is necessary to avoid
use of the word "exclusively," which does appear in the exemption, as mere surplusage. SEC
Securities Act Release No. 33-2029, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2140 (August 8, 1939). See
also Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at 97.
" See generally Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under the Securities Act: Once an Exemp-
tion, Not Always. . . , 31 MD. L. Rxv. 3 (1971).
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from each other with respect to maturity date, interest rate, re-
demption prices, and default provisions. The series B bonds will be
offered, under 3(a) (9), in exchange to the holders of the outstanding
series A bonds at equal principal. Cash needed to redeem any unex-
changed series A bonds will be raised by the private placement"' of
series C bonds to 12 insurance companies. Since the B and C offer-
ings are to occur more or less simultaneously, K wonders if the SEC
will view the two as a single issue.
The SEC General Counsel addressed this question as early as
1939.117 He noted that since the B and C bonds seemed in this
particular situation to be securities of different classes, there were
two issues, not one, and thus the B-for-A exchange qualified for
exemption under Section 3(a) (9). In so observing, however, he noted
that the larger question of definition was left unresolved:
In expressing this opinion I do not mean to imply that any differ-
ence in the incidents of two blocks of securities, however trivial, ren-
ders the blocks separate classes and consequently separate "issues"
for the purpose of the Act."'
Although identifying those elements in one offering that separate
it from another is not at all easy, the Commission has since sug-
gested certain guidelines"':
The determination ... will depend upon a consideration of var-
ious factors concerning the methods of sale and distribution em-
ployed to effect the offerings and the disposition of the proceeds. If
the offerings may be segregated into separate blocks, as evidenced by
material differences in the use of the proceeds, in the manner and
terms of distribution, and in similar related details, each offering will
be a separate "issue." In the main, of course, each case must be
determined upon the basis of its own facts.12'
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
"7 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-2029, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2140 (August 8,
1939).
1 Id. at 2141.
"' The doctrine that offerings under more than one exemption, or under an exemption and
a registration statement, may be "integrated" arises in connection with Sections 3(a)(9),
3(a)(11), 3(b) [Regulation A], and 4(2). The Commission has recently adopted rules to
establish more objective standards for interpreting and applying the federal securities laws.
The rules pertaining to Sections 3(a)(11) and 4(2) include provisions that identify certain
types of offers and sales of securities that will be deemed not part of an issue. Rule 146, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974); Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1974).
120 Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938).
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More than two decades later, the SEC listed, in Securities Act Re-
lease No. 33-4434,111 five factors that relate to the single issue re-
quirement:
(1) Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing;(2) [D]o the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security;
(3) [A]re the offerings made at or about the same time;
(4) [I]s the same type of consideration to be received; and
(5) [A]re the offerings made for the same general purpose.' 2
A recent no-action request by Four-Phase Systems, Inc.rs demon-
strates the interplay between the above guidelines for determining
integration under Section 3(a) (9) and the particular facts of related
transactions. Systems planned to issue $14 million in convertible
subordinated notes in a private placement contingent upon the
modification of its four outstanding series of preferred stock to pro-
vide, among other things, for an adjustment of the registration
rights of the preferred and to make the preferred dividends payable,
at its option, in common stock. Systems intended to rely upon Sec-
tion 3(a)(9) to exempt the modification of the old preferred and the
payment of stock dividends.
Even though Systems expected to issue its new, modified pre-
ferred and common stock dividends concurrently with the offering
of its notes, counsel for Systems, referring to Release No. 33-2029,
advanced several reasons why the two offerings should not be con-
sidered part of the same issue.124 First, the two offerings involved the
issuance of entirely different securities, preferred stock and notes.
Second, the consideration flowing from the investors was different.
The consideration in the exchange offering consisted principally of
the amendment of the old preferred's provisions, whereas it was
cash and cancellation of indebtedness in the sale of the notes. Third,
the two offerings were not for the same general purpose. Systems
was embarking on the exchange offer to defer or eliminate certain
continuing cash burdens and to simplify its capital structure. The
notes offering, on the other hand, was aimed at raising funds to
repay bank borrowings used to finance the present and future costs
of equipment. Fourth, the manner and the respective distributions
"1 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2270 (1961).
' Id. at 2608. The same factors are set out in preliminary note 3 to Rule 147.
22 Four-Phase Systems, Inc., supra note 27.
"2 Id. at frames 20375-76.
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were materially different. The exchange required shareholder action
(approval of a charter amendment) not required for the issuance
and sale of the notes, which were to be sold, on the other hand,
under more comprehensive purchase agreements that provided for
commission payments. Fifth, integration of the offerings would not
further the policy objectives of the Securities Act since Systems'
offerings did not constitute a single plan of financing artificially
segmented to avoid the rigors of the statute; the exchange, as dis-
tinct from the private placements, would not provide cash or other
payments. Sixth and last, integration of the offerings would conflict
with a policy reflected in recent SEC releases. Systems was not
registered under the 1934 Act. Registration under the 1933 Act
would thus apply to securities otherwise restricted, "and a thin and
unrealistic market in the securities of the Company could de-
velop.""' Faced with these considerations, the staff agreed that the
two offerings should not be integrated."'
D. The Absence of Remuneration or Commissions
An issuer undertaking a 3(a)(9) exchange must ensure that "no
commission or other remuneration is paid directly or indirectly for
soliciting such exchange." The phrase "commission or other remu-
neration" has never been construed '1 as prohibiting an issuer from
compensating those who assume ordinary transactional expenses.'
2
But when do expenses cease to be ordinary? The Chief of the Securi-
ties Division of the Federal Trade Commission has responded:
32 Id. at frame 20376.
32 See also Model Fin. Co., supra note 56, where the issuer planned to offer a series of new
junior subordinated debentures in exchange for certain outstanding debentures, some of
which had been sold in a Regulation A offering. The issuer planned the exchange under
Section 3(a)(9), although it would commence ten and one-half months after completion of
the first offering. The staff was persuaded that the two offerings were for different purposes
and issued a no-action letter-a result also reached on an integration question in Credithrift
Fin. Corp., [1971] "No AcTiON" LmETmTs, roll 7, frame 14745 (September 22, 1971).
I" Prior to the relocation of the exchange exemption from Section 4(3) to Section 3(a)(9),
the exemption was dependent upon the absence of any payment of remuneration "in connec-
tion with" the exchange.
However, to have construed that language as covering all payments made in connec-
tion with the exchange would in substance have rendered the exemption inoperative,
as all exchanges must call for some measure of remuneration, at least for routine and
mechanical services. The obvious impracticability of the restriction in its literal appli-
cation was recognized in the amendment, and the words "for solicitation" were substi-
tuted for the words "in connection with."
Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at 102.
212 See the discussion of Rule 150 in text accompanying note 107 supra.
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The dividing line to be drawn between "commission or other remu-
neration," which necessitates registration of such an exchange, and
"expenses," the payment of which would not withdraw the exemption
from an otherwise exempt exchange, must have regard to the purpose
of this particular exemption.
• . . [T]he Act recognizes that one of the causes for governing the
flotation of securities lay in the excessive promoters' or sponsors'
interests that were too often concealed from the investor. The divid-
ing line would thus distinguish between payments which are in es-
sence for promotional activity as distinguished from payments which
cover the expenses incident to such an exchange. These expenses
would, of course, include such matters as engraving costs, clerical
costs, but in addition could include a payment to third persons for
services in connection with effecting but not promoting such an ex-
change.'29
Thus, the remuneration limitation in Section 3(a) (9) speaks to three
separate issues: the nature of the services performed, the method of
compensating for those services, and the relationship between the
issuer and the person furnishing the services.
Officers, directors, and employees in a continuing employment
relationship with an issuer are naturally permitted to solicit and
even recommend a Section 3(a)(9) exchange, but only so long as
they are not rewarded with a bonus or special commission. 3 ' To
avoid any inference of special compensation for soliciting the ex-
change, the employees involved should receive only their regular
salaries and maintain their usual duties.13'
I" Letter from Chief of the Securities Division of the Federal Trade Commission, quoted
in 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2165 at 2588-89 (emphasis in original).
' See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,052 (SEC 1972), where the staff granted a no-action letter to Chris-Craft, which
argued that since it could act only through its officers, directors, and employees, so long as
these individuals received no special compensation in connection with the exchange offer,
Section 3(a)(9) permitted their communicating with security holders. The corporation also
believed that Section 3(a)(9) "permits officers and directors affirmatively to recommend to
bondholders that they accept the Exchange Offer." Id. at 82, 279. See also Shawnee Chiles
Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109, 117 (1941); Free Traders, Inc., 7 S.E.C. 913, 922 (1940); 1 L. Loss,
supra note 5, at 549.
,"I Thus, in Chris-Craft, the staff's no-action letter was effective "[p]rovided that the
activities of the directors or officers are only incidental to their regular duties." [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. at 82,278. In its letter of request, Chris-Craft was
careful to state that directors and officers who planned to assist the solicitation effort "will
receive their regular salaries and will also attend to their regular duties." Id. Accord, UniCap-
ital Corp., [1974] "No AcToN" LrrmTs, roll 11, frame 14957 (October 3, 1974).
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Payments to third persons for services in connection with an ex-
change, however, raise special problems not present with regular
employees. Certainly, persons hired temporarily to perform promo-
tional services would destroy the exemption, even if compensated
only by straight salary. Such persons can, however, be hired to
render purely mechanical services or even to assist in those func-
tions such as legal advice which, although not mechanical, "are in
their nature ancillary to the effective mechanical operation of the
transaction." '132 Hypothetically, if the services rendered are "me-
chanical 133 and do not fall within the ambit of "soliciting," as that
term is construed in Section 3(a)(9), the issuer can properly condi-
tion compensation upon the success of the exchange. But the practi-
cal risk facing the issuer is that a contingent fee arrangement for
what it believes are merely mechanical services could reasonably
result in an SEC determination that the services actually involved
solicitation and promotion. Consequently, such remuneration plans
are best avoided for even purely mechanical services.'
Investor relations firms which assist corporations in communicat-
ing with security holders present further substantial risks for the
issuer seeking Section 3(a)(9) exemption. If such a firm facilitates
publication of an issuer's exchange offer, it would be providing serv-
ices that might be considered exemption-destroying solicitation ac-
tivities. Certain services by an investor relations organization have
been interpreted 35 as not vitiating the exchange exemption. An
investor relations firm may, for instance, obtain a list of the issuer's
security holders to confirm the accuracy of addresses and may con-
tact the back office personnel of brokers, banks, and other nominees
to ensure that sufficient exchange materials have been received and
D2 Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at 102.
"3 See Infotronics Corp., supra note 56. The issuer proposed to offer its common stock in
exchange for certain outstanding debt securities. The staff granted a no-action letter under
Section 3(a)(9) and acknowledged that the issuer could pay all mechanical expenses incurred
in connection with the exchange offer such as "postage, telephone and telegraph bills, any
newspaper advertisements and travel expenses of employees considered necessary, as well as
the charges of its Transfer Agent and Registrar in connection with the issuance of the Com-
mon Stock and the cancellation of the Debentures and of the Notes and Warrants." Id. at
frame 05787.
Im The one notable exception is the standby arrangement, where it is customary to compen-
sate the investment banker on the basis of the number of securities tendered. See note 52
supra.
"3 See, e.g., Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc., supra note 33; El Paso Natural Gas Co., [1971]
"No ACTION" Lmarrm, roll 1, frame 00877 (February 9, 1971).
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are being promptly forwarded to beneficial holders.136 It may also
communicate directly with each holder to ascertain whether he has
received the issuer's mailings and understands the mechanics of the
exchange plan.3 7 It may further answer any questions on the me-
chanical procedures to be followed, even though a careful reading
of the offering material would provide that information.131
There are, nevertheless, quite clearly certain limits. If a firm is
questioned by a holder as to the investment-related attributes of the
exchange, it must - unlike employees under Chris-Craft - inform
the holder to seek advice from his own investment counsellor. Under
no circumstances may the firm make any recommendation, "di-
rectly or indirectly," regarding acceptance or rejection of the ex-
change plan or offer.13' The firm's compensation should, of course,
,36 See, e.g., The Carter Organization, Inc., [1975] "No AcrION" LarrERs, roll 4, frame
04086 (March 5, 1975).
I1" Id.
' See, e.g., Alpex Computers Co., supra note 44.
There are several policy arguments against interpreting the words "commission or other
remuneration" to include the compensation which investor relations organizations receive for
their services: (1) such firms rely heavily upon this type of service for their business; (2)
exchange transactions would become unduly burdensome for the issuing corporations if they
did not have the professional assistance provided by these firms; and (3) the remuneration is
paid not to solicit an exchange but merely to advertise the issuer's exchange plan to security
holders to whom it is addressed and to make sure that they will not inadvertently lose the
opportunity to participate. See Georgeson & Co., [1973] "No AcTION" LTTRS, roll 6, frame
10578 (May 10, 1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., supra note 130.
3I Id. See also Dean Witter & Co., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. T 80,078 (SEC November
21, 1974); Dean Witter & Co., Inc., [1975] "No ACTION" LrrERs, roll 2, frame 01204 (Janu-
ary 23, 1975). In the first inquiry, Dean Witter requested no-action treatment on a proposed
involvement, as an investor relations organization, in an exchange transaction between two
corporations where it planned to offer services that were acceptable under staff interpreta-
tions of Section 3(a)(9). It also planned to render an opinion concerning the "fairness" of the
proposed exchange to the corporation's shareholders and to telephone shareholders to inquire
whether they had received the exchange material and answer any questions raised by such
shareholders concerning the information contained in the material. The staff responded that
such services, "particularly the expression of an opinion by it concerning the fairness of the
proposed exchange coupled with subsequent telephone discussions of the exchange with
shareholders would raise serious doubts as to whether Dean Witter would be engag[ed] in
soliciting activities. . ." Id. at 85,030.
In the second communication with the staff, Dean Witter sought an interpretation of this
above-quoted portion of the staff's response. Counsel for Dean Witter suggested that the
staff's rejection of the earlier request for no-action had been due to its concern over the
coupling of Dean Witter's "fairness opinion" in an offering circular with those services requir-
ing telephone discussions between Dean Witter personnel and shareholders. Id. at frame
01207. Consequently, counsel informed the staff that Dean Witter would uncouple those
services so that in any one transaction the services would include either: (1) all the usual non-
controversial activities, plus the rendering of its formal "fairness opinion" to the stockholders
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 61:1057
be on a fixed-fee-plus-necessary-expenses basis and not related in
any way to the amount of the securities tendered in the exchange.'
Otherwise, its financial interest in the success of the exchange will
quite naturally lead the SEC staff to view the transaction as suf-
fused with a promotive aspect.
E. Resale of Securities Acquired Under Section 3(a)(9)
There are, then, four prerequisites to a claim by an issuer of an
exchange exemption under Section 3(a)(9). (1) The securities for
exchange must be offered by the same entity that issued the out-
standing ones. (2) The security holder must not be asked to part
with anything of value besides the outstanding security. (3) The
exchange must be offered exclusively to the issuer's existing security
holders. (4) The issuer must not pay any compensation for the solici-
tation of the exchange. It should also be noted that Section 3(a)(9)
may impose some problems upon the offeree. As a transactional
exemption, Section 3(a)(9) provides an exemption only once; it does
not exempt the subsequent sale of the new securities once re-
ceived.14 ' A security holder involved in such a sale must find another
exemption or comply with the registration requirements of the Act.
In most cases, of course, an exemption can be found under Section
personally and in the offering circular, but no other communication between Dean Witter and
the shareholders; or (2) all the usual activities, plus communication by Dean Witter with
shareholders including its formal "fairness opinion," but without inserting the opinion in the
offering circular. Id. at frame 01208. The staff rejected the proffered interpretation and
adhered to its original position. "In our view, there is an inconsistency on the surface in the
proposition that representatives of a firm which has expressed an opinion (whether publicly
stated or not) on the fairness of a proposed exchange may initiate contacts with security
holders voting on the exchange and express wholly impartial views on questions raised by
those security holders." Id. at frame 01205. The staff also refused to authorize Dean Witter
to be named in an offering circular as Dealer-Manager of an exchange.
, o Id. at frames 09383-85.
" See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-646, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 2136 (1936). SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4162, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. II
76,677 (1959), states:
It has been generally understood that a conversion is an exchange within the mean-
ing of section 3(a)(9), with the result that the actual transaction of conversion is
exempt if the other conditions of the section are satisfied. It is clear, however, that
there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of securities issued in a transaction falling
within section 3(a)(9) which justifies consideration of such securities as permanently
exempt from registration without regard to any other factors.
Id. at 80,540. The classic case is Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3825, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE. 76,539 (1957).
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4(1), 42 but not always.
The danger to the unwary is that the exchangee might be deemed
a statutory underwriter and thereby lose an exemption under Sec-
tion 4(1). The staff, as a matter of policy, refuses to express an
opinion as to whether a person would be deemed an underwriter
under this or that set of circumstances, on the grounds that it is
simply a question of fact. It has indicated, nonetheless, factors
which it considers important in making its determination. An in-
vestment banker who is a party to a standby agreement' in an
exchange transaction, for example, will be concerned not only with
the availability of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption but also with
whether he will be considered an underwriter if he resells the securi-
ties acquired under the agreement. The resolution of these issues,
according to the staff, depends on whether the investment banker
purchases the securities from the issuer with a view to their distribu-
tion, sells them for an issuer in connection with a distribution, or
participates in any such undertaking.' Whether intent to distrib-
ute exists, in turn, "depends on such factors, among others, as the
amount of securities to be sold and the manner in which it is pro-
posed to sell them."'4
Another relevant factor in assessing underwriter status is whether
the selling security holder himself, or the person from whom he has
acquired his securities, is in a position to control the issuer.'" If he
2 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970):
The provisions of section 77e of this title shall not apply to -
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.
m See text accompanying note 49 supra.
" See, e.g., Salomon Brothers, supra note 50.
"' Id. at frame 14885. In preliminary note 2 to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Rule 144], the SEC lists three factors to be considered in determining when
a person is deemed not to be engaged in a distribution. First, the underlying policy of the
Act requires that there be adequate current information concerning the issuer. Second, a
holding period prior to resale is essential to ensure that security holders are not acting "as
conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of
an issuer." A third factor is the impact of the particular transaction or transactions on the
trading markets. A person reselling securities under Section 4(1) of the Act
must sell the securities in such limited quantities and in such a manner as not to
disrupt the trading markets. The larger the amount of securities involved, the more
likely it is that such resales may involve methods of offering and amounts of compensa-
tion usually associated with a distribution rather than routine trading transactions.
148 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970). The "control" or "affiliate" concept is defined in Rule 405,
which reads:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling, .... controlled by" and "under
common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
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is himself a control person, his resales might constitute a non-
exempt secondary distribution. Even if the selling security holder
does not control the issuer, Section 2(11) of the Act may apply. That
section designates a control person as an "issuer" for the limited
purpose of defining statutory underwriter liability. The effect of the
definition in Section 2(11) is that anyone who acquires securities
from a controlling person with a view to their distribution or partici-
pates in that person's distribution of securities falls within the defi-
nition of "underwriter" and will not have an exemption under Sec-
tion 4(1).
The adoption of Rule 144 and the staff's interpretations of it
relative to Section 3(a)(9) transactions suggest a consideration of
three separate issues before one can confidently conclude that a
security holder may sell his new securities under the Section 4(1)
exemption: (1) Is the security holder a control person, termed "affil-
iate" in Rule 144? (2) Did the security holder acquire his old securi-
ties directly or indirectly from the issuer, or from an affiliate of such
issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving a
public offering? (3) Was the exchange in which the security holder
acquired his new securities a nonpublic transaction?
Rule 144 assists an affiliate, who would otherwise be unsure of an
exemption, by permitting him to resell a limited amount of securi-
ties without fear of being deemed an underwriter. An affiliate who
acquires securities in an exempt exchange can, therefore, turn to the
rule for protected resales. But in certain exchanges, an affiliate may
find the new securities subject to a holding period under Rule 144
even though the surrendered securities contained no such disability.
Likewise, a nonaffiliated person who receives new securities in an
exempt exchange, although normally in a position to transfer freely
the new securities under Section 4(1), may in some cases be limited
by the conditions of Rule 144. Specifically, the right of any security
holder - be he affiliate or nonaffiliate - to sell, without registra-
tion, new securities received in an exchange is limited by the man-
ner in which he acquired both his old securities and the new securi-
ties issued under Section 3(a)(9). The first limitation depends on
whether the old securities were "restricted" within the meaning of
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through
the ownership of voting securities, by contract or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1974). See generally Sommer, Who's "In Control"? - S.E.C., 21 Bus.
LAw. 559 (1966).
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Rule 144. The second results from a staff interpretation of Section
3(a)(9) that distinguishes between "public" and "non-public" ex-
change transactions, and must be discussed in the context of the
first.
1. Where Non-restricted Securities Are Surrendered in the
Exchange
Rule 144 categorizes securities as either restricted or non-
restricted. Restricted securities are those "acquired directly or indi-
rectly from the issuer thereof, or from an affiliate of such issuer, in
a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offer-
ing." 47 If the old securities are not restricted,48 and the exchange
transaction has a public character, new securities acquired by
nonaffiliates may subsequently be freely traded. Assume, for exam-
ple, that a corporation L completes an intrastate offering of its
subordinated debentures to a sizeable number of residents in com-
pliance with Section 3(a)(11). Later, L exchanges its common stock
for the outstanding debentures, using a Section 3(a)(9) exemption.
If L's exchange offer were made to more than a few of the original'49
debenture holders, so that the exchange does not resemble a private
placement, the common stock received in the exchange could be
resold immediately by nonaffiliates without registration. 50 Any
' Rule 144(a)(3).
" Non-restricted securities include those securities offered to the public pursuant to a
registration statement or in a transaction meeting the requirements of Section 3(a)(10),
3(a)(11), 3(b), or 3(c).
"' Nonaffiliates who did not acquire the debentures directly or indirectly from the issuer
may hold restricted securities if they acquired them from an affiliate. Rule 144(a)3. For a
discussion of resales by nonaffiliates of securities acquired in a Section 3(a)(9) transaction
where the securities surrendered are restricted, see text accompanying note 154 infra.
I" See, e.g., Wright Air Lines, Inc., supra note 30; American Electronic Laboratories, Inc.,
supra note 30.
The staff has received several inquiries concerning the availability of Section 4(1) to non-
American holders of securities acquired in a Section 3(a)(9) exchange. See, e.g., Sperry Rand
Corp., [1974] "No ACTION" L'rRs, roll 3, frame 03435 (March 1, 1974). Sperry sold $60
million in debentures in London to an international underwriting syndicate, which purchased
with a view to distributing the debentures through resale outside the United States to persons
who were neither United States nor Canadian nationals, citizens, or residents. The deben-
tures were not registered under the Act in reliance upon Securities Act Release Nos. 33-4708,
34-7366, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 1361-63 (SEC 1964), in which the SEC announced
that registration would not be required for securities of domestic issuers which were distrib-
uted abroad under circumstances reasonably designed to preclude their distribution within,
or to nations of, the United States.
Sperry then proposed to issue shares of its common stock in a Section 3(a)(9) exchange for
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such public non-registered resales of the common stock by an
affiliate of L, on the other hand, would be subject to the conditions
of Rule 144.
Suppose, however, that the old non-restricted securities were ex-
changed in a Section 3(a)(9) transaction that is basically private in
character - say by only five of the debenture holders, all of whom
are nonaffiliates. May those five investors resell immediately? Argu-
ably, the shares of common stock acquired by the five investors are
restricted securities as defined in Rule 144(a)(3), since they were
"acquired directly . . . from the issuer thereof. . . in a transaction
. . . not involving any public offering." The Commission took a
similar position under old Rule 155 as to convertible securities is-
sued in reliance on Section 3(a) (9).1 51
the debentures held by the non-American holders. The staff agreed not to recommend any
action so long as Sperry complied with all of the section's requirements. Sperry's counsel
further argued that registration would not be necessary in connection with the ultimate resale
of any common stock issued upon conversion as the debenture holder was not an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer within the meaning of Section 4(1) of the Act. (1974] "No AcnoN"
LgrrEas, roll 3, at frame 03448 (letter of Corp. counsel). Here, however, the staff refused to
decide, before the fact, "when and under what circumstances the Debentures or the common
stock issuable upon convqrsion of the Debentures may be resold in the United States or to
citizens, residents or nationals of the United States." Id. at frame 03439. Accord, Masco
Corp., [1973] "No AcMON" LmrTERS, roll 8, frame 14121A (July 23, 1973); International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., [1973] "No AcrION" LETrERs, roll 6, frame 10572 (May 3, 1973). In one such
request, however, the staff stated that it was unable to conclude that it would not recommend
appropriate action to the Commission if the securities "were to be distributed" in the United
States without registration, International Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,462 (SEC 1973), leaving open the possibility of resales in the United
States which would not constitute a "distribution." With respect to the applicability of Rule
144, the staff responded to a no-action inquiry that securities originally issued to European
investors without registration under the Act are not restricted securities under the definition
of Rule 144(a)(3). However, the staff hastened to point out that it did not therefore imply
that those European shares had "come to rest abroad," as this was a factual determination
which would be left, at least initially, to the company's judgment. The First Artists Prod.
Co., [1972] "No AcTION" LrrERs, roll 9, frame 14997 (August, 1972).
"' SEC Securities Act Release No. 4248, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 76,710 (1960). Rule 155 provided that:
(a) The phrase "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering" in Sec-
tion 4(2) of the Act shall not include: (1) any public offering of a convertible security
(which at the time of such offering is immediately convertible into another security of
the same issuer) by or on behalf of any person or persons who purchased the convertible
security directly or indirectly from an issuer as part of a nonpublic offering of such
security, or (2) any public offering by or on behalf of any such person or persons of the
security acquired on conversion of a convertible security, unless the security so ac-
quired was acquired under such circumstances that such person or persons are not
underwriters within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
Rule 155 remains effective only for those securities acquired prior to, but not sold thereafter
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Yet, there are at least two reasons why Rule 144(a)(3) restricted
securities should not be interpreted to mean simply securities re-
ceived in a non-public exchange. First, the Commission's position
in the old Rule 155 area is inappropriate precedent here. Rule 155
was a corrective measure, narrowly drawn, to plug a hole in the
private placement exemption that had allowed issuers, through the
use of convertible securities, to distribute their securities in a two-
step process." 2 Rule 144, on the other hand, represents a major
reform in the Commission's disclosure system, embracing many dif-
ferent transactions and imposing burdensome restrictions on those
subject to it.
Second, a public-non-public distinction in exchange transac-
tions is essentially artificial. It is neither consistent with the purpose
of Rule 144111 nor protective of the public in those transactions where
the public most needs protection. Such a distinction allows nonaffi-
hates to resell immediately where they obtain the new securities in
a public exchange, even though adequate current information con-
cerning the issuer is unavailable and the likelihood of active trading
is enhanced because the securities are widely held. But where only
a few security holders participate in the exchange transaction - the
under, Rule 144. The Commission took the position that where a convertible security was
issued in a non-public transaction, "whether or not the transaction might also be urged as
one falling within the literal mold of one of the stated exemptions [§§ 3(a)(9), 3(a)(10),
3(a)(11), 3(b), 3(c), or Rule 1331," Rule 155 would apply. The Commission gave the following
example:
If, apart from Section 3(a)(9), an exchange offer of a convertible security is essentially
private in character, any later public offering of the convertible security (if then imme-
diately convertible) and any public offering of the underlying security received upon
conversion would be subject to the proposed rule. On the other hand, if the exchange
offer is essentially a public offering which, except for the provisions of Section 3(a)(9),
would be subject to the registration and prospectus provisions of the Act, the proposed
rule would not apply either to a later public offering of the convertible security, or of
the underlying security, by the holders. If such an offering were made by or on behalf
of a person in a control relationship with the issuer or by or on behalf of a person acting
as an underwriter for such control person, registration would be necessary without
reference to Section 3(a)(9) or the proposed Rule 155.
Id. at 80,655. Rule 155 was rescinded at the time Rule 144 was adopted.
"I See, e.g., Orrick, Registration Problems Under the Federal Securities Act - Resales
Following Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions, 10 HASTINS L.J. 1 (1958); Sargent, supra
note 7.
M5 One of the purposes of Rule 144 was to effectuate the underlying policy of the Act, the
protection of investors, by requiring "that there be current information concerning the issuer,
whether the resales of securities by persons result in a distribution or are effected in trading
transactions." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. Ji 78,487, at 81,053 (1972).
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so-called private exchange - the "public" is "protected" by Rule
144, even though the securities acquired in the exchange may be
few, and the nonaffiliate security holders who formerly held nonres-
tricted securities now find themselves saddled with restricted ones.
2. Where Restricted Securities Are Surrendered in the Exchange:
The Problem of Tacking
Since Section 3(a)(9) is a transactional exemption, security hold-
ers who part with restricted securities in an exempt recapitalization
will find their new securities still carrying the "taint" of the prede-
cessors and subject to the two-year holding period under Rule 144.
Rule 144's continuing burdens on such security holders might ac-
tually be greater after the exchange than they were before it, de-
pending on when the holding period is determined to have com-
menced. Whether the .holding period of the old securities survives
the exchange, to be counted toward the holding period of the new,
or whether the period begins anew with the subsequent acquisition
depends on the applicability of Rule 144's formal tacking, provisions
and the essentially public or private character of the exchange., 4
Rule 144(d)(4) contains the tacking provisions that offer relief in
some cases to holders of restricted securities who exchange them in
a 3(a)(9) transaction. Securities received in a recapitalization, for
example, are treated as having been acquired at the same time as
the original securities surrendered.' 5 While Rule 144 does not define
the term "recapitalization," the staff interprets it to include certain
Section 3(a)(9) exchanges that are public in character.' 5 Likewise,
securities acquired on conversion are deemed, by virtue of Rule
"I One writer has suggested that where the security holder is an affiliate, the staff will
probably not allow tacking and will instead insist on a two-year holding period irrespective
of the character of the offering. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 5, at 4-142 (1972). But see Wright
Air Lines, Inc., supra note 30, where the staff permitted an officer and a director of the issuer
to utilize the tacking provision of Rule 144(d)(4)(ii) for securities acquired in a Section 3(a)(9)
exchange. See note 162 infra, for a discussion of the no-action letter.
' Rule 144(d)(4)(i) provides:
(i) Stock Dividends, Splits and Recapitalizations. Securities acquired from the issuer
as a dividend or pursuant to a stock split, reverse split or recapitalization shall be
deemed to have been acquired at the same time as the securities on which the dividend
or, if more than one, the initial dividend was paid, the securities involved in the split
or reverse split, or the securities surrendered in connection with the recapitalization.
'5, See, e.g., Wright Air Lines, Inc., supra note 30; International Sys. & Controls Corp.,
[19721 "No ACTIoN" LMErr.s, roll 10, frame 16451 (September 14, 1972).
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144(d)(4)(ii), to have been acquired at the same time.1 57
The value of Rule 144(d) (4) to a security holder here is, however,
somewhat limited in view of the staff's broad reading of the defini-
tion of "restricted securities" in Rule 144(a) (3) and its narrow inter-
pretation of "recapitalization" in Rule 144(d)(4)(i). Suppose that
corporation M offers and sells 100,000 debentures to 20 investors
under Regulation A and it later exchanges with each two shares of
its common stock for each debenture outstanding in a transaction
exempt under Section 3(a)(9). As noted earlier,"8 the staff might
view the shares of common stock acquired by the 20 investors as
restricted securities since the exchange resembles a private place-
ment. Even though M as the issuer may claim an exemption under
Section 3(b), a literal reading of Rule 144(a)(3) certainly implies
that the 20 debenture holders own restricted securities, in which
case the permissibility of tacking holding periods again arises.
The security holders would then argue, of course, that the ex-
change constituted a Rule 144(d)(4)(i) "recapitalization" and,
therefore, that the two-year holding period for the common stock
started when they acquired the old debentures. Such a literal read-
ing is risky, however, since the staff has taken the position that not
all 3(a)(9) recapitalizations qualify for tacking under Rule
144(d)(4)(i). If the exchange transaction is limited to the few secu-
rity holders usually associated with a private placement, the staff
may characterize it as a "negotiated exchange"'' 5 and not as a "re-
capitalization." Although it is far from clear,"' the staff seems to
"' Rule 144 (d)(4)(ii) provides:
Conversions. If the securities sold were acquired from the issuer for a consideration
consisting solely of other securities of the same issuer surrendered for conversion, the
securities so acquired shall be deemed to have been acquired at the same time as the
securities surrendered for conversion.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306 [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1 79,000 (1972), the Division of Corporate Finance's interpretative release on Rule 144.
Although Rule 155 was rescinded with the adoption of Rule 144, Rule 155 still applies to
sales outside Rule 144 of privately placed convertible securities, or their underlying securities,
acquired before April 15, 1972. For an example where Rule 155 was available in conjunction,
with a Section 3(a)(9) exchange, see Computer Response Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SE. L. REP. T 79,228 (SEC 1972).
See text accompanying note 151 supra.
Computer Network Corp., [1973] "No AcTION" LETTERS, roll 1, frame 00840 (Dec. 27,
1972).
"I' The staff has issued four interpretations in this area. In International Sys. & Controls
Corp., supra note 156, the staff took the view that in a voluntary exchange of shares of
preferred stock for shares of a new class of preferred stock in a transaction exempt under
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require here a recapitalization that has either been approved by a
vote of security holders'' or is tantamount to a recapitalization
pursuant to such a vote." 2 As a result, the holding period for the 20
investors in M's "negotiated" exchange transaction would not begin
until the acquisition of the new common stock.
At first, the staff's narrow interpretation of a Rule 144(d)(4)(i)
recapitalization is difficult to reconcile with its treatment of Rule
144(d) (4) (ii). In the hypothetical just discussed, the exchange of M
common stock for M debentures produced restricted securities that
require a full two-year holding period from the time the exchange
occurred. If, instead, M had issued 100,000 debentures with a con-
version feature that allowed the 20 holders later to convert one
debenture into two shares of common stock, Rule 144(d)(4)(ii)
Section 3(a)(9), the new preferred would be deemed to have been acquired at the same time
as the old preferred for purposes of computing the holding period.
But beginning with Computer Response Corp., supra note 157, the staff has taken a very
narrow view of "recapitalization" in Rule 144(d)(4)(i). In this case, involving a voluntary
exchange (structured to comply with Section 3(a)(9)) of subordinated notes and common
stock for outstanding senior subordinated convertible debentures, the staff concluded that the
securities received in exchange for the debentures should be deemed to have been acquired
on the date of the exchange for the purposes of Rule 144. In Computer Network Corp., supra
note 159, Computer exchanged senior convertible preferred stock and 8 percent notes for
certain 81/2 percent promissory notes as part of a series of arrangements with major share-
holders and creditors undertaken to effect a certain corporate acquisition. The staff character-
ized the exchange as "negotiated" and as one which "did not constitute a recapitalization as
that term is used in Rule 144." In Genway Corp., [1973] "No AcTION" LmrrE, roll 6, frame
10720 (May 11, 1973), the staff rejected counsel's claim of a "recapitalization" for an
exchange of common stock for convertible preferred, despite the fact that (1) the entire
capital structure of Genway was changed; (2) the recapitalization, which was exempt under
Section 3(a)(9), could not have been accomplished merely by reaching agreement with certain
security holders of Genway; (3) the transaction required an amendment to the issuer's certifi-
cate of incorporation and required approval of its stockholders at a special meeting; and (4)
the transaction constituted a "recapitalization" for the purposes of Section 368(a)(1)(E) of
the Internal Revenue Code. In denying the requested no-action, the staff placed special
emphasis on the fact that "the convertible preferred stock was acquired in a private place-
ment in reliance upon the Section 4(2) exemption . . . . Securities received in exchange for
convertible securities acquired in a private placement should be deemed, for purposes of
resale under Rule 144 to have been acquired on the date of the exchange." Id. frame 00840
(December 27, 1972).
161 See, e.g., Canrad Precision Indus., Inc., supra note 30. See Release 5306, supra note 157,
for an interpretive response to the applicability of Rule 144(d)(4)(i).
"I, See, e.g., Wright Air Lines, Inc., supra note 30, where the proposed recapitalization was
conditioned upon participation by all of the security holders involved. The staff has permitted
tacking under Rule 144(d)(4)(i) following other exempt exchanges, but the facts as reported
in the correspondence made available to the public are not sufficient to use in attempting to
construct a pattern of staff policy. See, e.g., Decraform, Inc., supra note 25.
1104
Section 3(a)(9) Recapitalizations
would regard the common stock as standing in the same place- as
the convertible debenture itself. In short, in the voluntary exchange,
tacking is not allowed; in the voluntary conversion, it is.163 Under
either method of financing, of course, the transaction will qualify
under Section 3(a)(9). And all the same factors are present-public
information, holding period, and quantity limitations-that ini-
tially led the SEC to conclude that resales under Rule 144 are not
"distributions" and thus exempt from the stringent reporting re-
quirements of Section 5. Consequently, one might argue, it makes
little sense to treat the two voluntary transactions -differently for
registration purposes.
Yet a significant difference does exist. Under Rule 144(d)(4)(ii)
tacking is permitted only with true convertible securities.)" Also,
the security must be convertible into another security of the same
issuer."'5 Both of these limitations restrict tacking to situations prior
to purchase where the convertible security holder is in a knowledge-
able position to decide whether to acquire both the convertible secu-
rity and the underlying security for investment rather than for dis-
tribution. A single holding pefiod of two years is sufficient objective
proof that each of the two restricted securities had been acquired
and held with the requisite investment intent. The same, however,
cannot be said of all recapitalizations under Section 3(a)(9). Con-
sider, for example, investors who have purchased non-convertible
debentures in a private placement. Presumably, they are aware of
the investment risks of the debentures and are not taking them with
"I See Wright Air Lines, Inc., supra note 30, where two individual stockholders failed in
their argument for tacking under Rule 144(d)(4)(i) but were successful under Rule
144(d)(4)(ii). The two stockholders were an officer and a director of the issuer who had
acquired shares of convertible preferred stock in 1970 from Wright Air Lines, Inc. in a private
placement. After holding the convertible preferred stock for over three years, the two stock.
holders converted it to common stock. When they asked the staff whether they could resell
the shares of common stock immediately in reliance on Rule 144, the staff responded that
the exchange, which was an exempt transaction for the issuer under Section 3(a)(9), did not
constitute a recapitalization within the meaning of Rule 144(d)(4)(i). The staff apparently
viewed the conversion of the'convertible preferred as a "negotiated exchange," although it
did note that the preferred stock could be considered a convertible security within the mean-
ing of Rule 144(d)(4)(ii). As such, the common stock would be deemed to have been acquired
on the same date as the preferred for purposes of computing the Rule's holding period.
" See, e.g., Manufacturer's Sys., Inc., [1973] "No ACTION" LmrrEns, roll 2, frame 02210
(January 18, 1973); Nationwide Nursing Centers, Inc., [1972] "No ACTION" LETras, roll 12,
frame 19519 (November 13, 1972); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306, supra note 157.
"' See, e.g., Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp., [1972] "No ACTION" LETrERS, roll 10, frame
16416 (September 12, 1972); Power Physics Corp., [1972] "No ACTION" LEr-TRS, roll 8, frame
13888 (July 25, 1972).
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a view to their distribution. If one year after purchase they are asked
to exchange their restricted debentures for the issuer's common
stock, under Section 3(a)(9) they may or may not be provided infor-
mation about the full investment value of the new securities. In any
event, since the investors did not know at the time they originally
purchased the debentures that subsequently they would be ex-
changing them for the issuer's common stock, it is impossible to
ascertain whether their investment representations covered both the
debentures and the common stock. As a result, tacking is inappro-
priate and a new two-year holding period begins from the time of
the exchange. Rule 144(d)(4)(i), as the staff apparently interprets
it, mitigates the severity of such a no-tacking policy for those ex-
changes that are not "voluntary" or "negotiated" but are, instead,
the result of a complete restructuring of the capitalization of an
entity, requiring the approval of security holders.' 6
III. RECONCILING THE 3(a) (9) EXCHANGE EXEMPTION WITH THE POLICY
OF CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE
According to the SEC, Congress created, through the federal
securities statutes, a continuous disclosure system designed to
protect investors afid to assure the maintenance of fair and honest
security markets.'67 The registration requirements of Section 5 of the
"' In a sense, the suggested interpretation is reminiscemt of the "no-sale" theory under old
Rule 133: where a proposed corporate act is submitted to security holders as a class, in their
capacity as members of the corporate body, an act of submission does not involve an offer to
exchange with any stockholder as an individual. See generally Purcell, A Consideration of
the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 254 (1958).
An even narrower interpretation of Rule 144(d)(4)(i) is possible if one focuses on the theory
behind the two other categories of that provision, stock dividends and stock splits. In both
cases, the new security does not change the nature of the capital at risk. "The securities
acquired merely change their form. . . The new securities arise out of the old ones." Comm'r
Loomis, quoted in Smith, Fungibility, Tacking, Registration Covenants, in PLI, THIRD
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 55, 71 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. eds.
1972). To be consistent, one might interpret "recapitalization" in Rule 144(d)(4)(i) as
encompassing only those exchanges where the new security is not materially different from
the one exchanged. Tacking would, therefore, be limited to recapitalizations where there is
no new investment decision. It is then, perhaps, significant that the example of tacking under
Rule 144(d)(4)(i) selected by the Division of Corporate Finance for its interpretative release
on Rule 144 involved a limited recapitalization, changing the par value of the issuer's common
stock. Release 5306, supra note 157, at 82,159. Such a narrow interpretation would have the
operative effect of restricting tacking under Rule 144(d)(4)(i) to recapitalizations where an
exemption is unnecessary since, arguably, any action taken would not amount to the sale of
a new security. See note 21 supra.
"' See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
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Securities Act of 1933 form an integral part of this disclosure sys-
tem. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide specific exemptions
from these registration requirements for certain securities or certain
transactions. 6 ' Section 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) exemptions turn on
the intrinsic nature of the securities or the impropriety of further
governmental regulation.69 The other exemptions in Sections 3 and
4 are limited to specific transactions which for a-variety of reasons
do not justify full and detailed compliance with Section 5. Some of
these transaction exemptions require certain disclosure to investors
as a condition for exemption, 70 but other sections, including Section
3(a)(9), do not. In view of this fact, it is important to ask to what
extent the Section 3(a)(9) exemption squares with the disclosure
objectives of the Act as administered and implemented by the SEC
through Rules 146 and 147.171
Section 3(a)(9), and Sections 3(a)(10) and 3(a)(11), are, in fact,
glaring exceptions to the "continuous disclosure system." By their
terms, these exemptive provisions relieve issuers of the necessity of
providing investors or outstanding security holders with the infor-
mation they might need to make informed investment decisions.
Section 3(a)(10) offers a substitute for disclosure requirements,
being conditioned upon judicial or administrative review of a pro-
posed securities exchange. The principal justification - no matter
how ill-founded - of Section 3(a)(11) is that investors, who must
be residents of the same state as the issuer, will be adequately
protected by state securities statutes. Section 3(a)(9) is narrow in
terms of scope, exempting only exchanges of securities and not the
issuance of new securities for cash. Furthermore, it is unavailable
to non-issuers, limited to an issuer's present security holders, and
proscriptive of the use of paid solicitors. While it thus falls short of
SEC. L. REP. 79,617 at 83,649 (1974); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RsP. 1 79,015 at 82,197 (1972); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,487 at 81,051
(1972). Cf. the discussion of similar statutory purpose behind the Exchange Act in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
,CR See note 22 supra.
See generally Throop & Lane, supra note 7, at 92.
,,0 See, e.g., Section 4(2) and Rule 146.
"' With the adoption of these rules, the Commission sought "to coordinate and integrate
this disclosure system with the exemptive provisions" of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 33-5487, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 2710 at 2907-2 (1974); see Securities
Act Release No. 5450, supra note 167.
1975] 1107
Virginia Law Review
the independent supervision of Section 3(a)(10), which in certain
respects resembles the per se exemptions of the Act, it is less incon-
sistent with the objectives of the Act than is Section 3(a)(11).
Given these restrictions, perhaps Section 3(a) (9) is an appropriate
exemptive provision that should be integrated into a continuous
disclosure system. After all, the issuer that claims the exemption is
not relieved "from the responsibility for disclosure necessary to
avoid infractions of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws.' '72 In many exchange transactions an issuer will either volun-
tarily furnish its security holders with critical information about the
transaction or be compelled to do so by other state or federal regula-
tions.13 And, at any rate, if the outstanding securities were offered
pursuant to an agreement that obligated the issuer to exchange
subsequently other securities for those originally issued, the security
holders may have already received sufficient information about the
proposed transaction. In some exchanges, too, no actual investment
decision is required by security holders since the outstanding securi-
ties are valueless or clearly inferior to the securities offered by the
issuer. Finally, in most exchange transactions the benefits of regis-
tration or prescribed disclosure are outweighed within the restricted
confines of Section 3(a)(9) by the fact that security holders are not
investing additional money or other value but are simply substitut-
ing the form of their investment in an issuer with which they pre-
sumably are already acquainted.
There is, however, a case for SEC-controlled disclosure under
Section 3(a)(9), at least for some transactions. To begin, it appears
that many of the present uses of Section 3(a)(9) are inconsistent
with its original purpose, as revealed by its legislative history, to
balance disclosure against the facts that recapitalization itself puts
present security holders on notice that the corporation is in some
degree of financial disadvantage and that the financial remedy
should be as quick and as easy as feasible.' Even in situations
where an exemption from full registration would be advisable, mini-
mal disclosure standards may be necessary. The SEC has in fact
112 Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., supra note 56, at frame 13489.
"I See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 77n(a) (1970); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a(1) et seq. (1973) (rules for the solicitation of proxies under Section 14a). Thus,
security holders who are asked to amend the issuer's certificate of incorporation as a prelimi-
nary step in a recapitalization program are likely to receive some information about the
exchange in the issuer's proxy statement.
7 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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broadened its focus beyond an issuer's periodic or ad hoc disclosure
of material information to include its participation in a "continu-
ous" disclosure system.7 5
Indeed, a recapitalization under the exchange exemption can
present, as we have seen, complex investment alternatives upon
which security holders must decide. Even where an exchange offer
represents an immediate financial advantage for them, the ultimate
consequences of the transaction may have greater significance for
all, or some, holders than the financial data might otherwise sug-
gest. Neither the presence of conscientious management nor the
application of other disclosure-oriented legislation can guarantee
that information such as the following will be highlighted and ex-
plained adequately to exchange offerees:(1) the market price history of the securities involved in the ex-
change;
(2) the differences between the value of the security offered and
the net book value, net quick asset value, and earnings per share of
the outstanding security;
(3) the underlying reasons for the exchange;(4) the intended group of participants - whether, for instance, all
security holders are to be included in the exchange and whether
insiders will be tendering their securities;
(5) the history of recent securities transactions by the issuer and
insiders; and
"I It should be noted that, unlike the more general Section 3(a)(11), whose use can bejustified in states where blue sky laws require disclosure in intrastate offerings, see, e.g., NewYork Intra-State Financing Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-ff (McKinney Supp. 1974), Sec-
tion 3(a)(9) has been followed in similar exemptions from disclosure requirements under most
state securities statutes. As of July 1974 the Uniform Securities Act had been adopted or
substantially adopted with modifications in 32 states and the District of Columbia. 1 CCH
BLUE SKY L. REP. 4901 at 701-02. The Act requires an issuer to file a registration statement
and all sales and advertising literature to be used in a securities offering. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 403 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Section 402(b)(11) exempts the following transaction from
those requirements:
(11) any transaction pursuant to an offer to existing security holders of the issuer,
including persons who at the time of the transaction are holders of convertible securi-
ties, non-transferable warrants, or transferable warrants exercisable within not more
than ninety days of their issuance, if (A) no commission or other remuneration (other
than a standby commission) is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any
security holder in this state, or (B) the issuer first files a notice specifying the terms
of the offer and the [Administrator] does not by order disallow the exemption within
the next five full business days ....
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(6) the projected consequences of a successful or unsuccessful ex-
change, such as the impact on the issuer's present indebtedness and
borrowing capacity, the probability that dilution will occur, the
effect on the working capital position, or the likelihood of a change
in corporate control.'
Section 3(a)(9) is most vulnerable to criticism in its exemption of
exchange offers, which can present special risks to security holders,
as the recent attempts at "going private"'77 have demonstrated. In
Broder v. Dane,' a 1934 Act case, a federal district court, after
reviewing some of the problems faced by stockholders who received
an exchange offer from their own corporation, concluded that
it is wholly consonant with congressional intent [reflected in the
Williams Act of 1968] to place a heavier burden of disclosure and fair
dealing upon a corporation and its insiders who are acting in their
own behalf than would be justified were this a case involving a con-
tested tender offer.'7'
This conclusion was bolstered by three interrelated considerations,
all of which could be present in a Section 3(a)(9) transaction. First,
unlike the tender offer battle between entrenched management and
outside interlopers, an exchange offer by the issuer contains "no
opposing factions possessing both the incentive and resources
needed to challenge and elaborate upon the assertions contained in
the initial offer.""' Second, since no opposing group is
,76 See generally the checklist for disclosure in Beck, Corporate Repurchases and Going
Private - Disclosure Requirements, in PLI, SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATON 365, 376 (1974).
'7 The exchange offer, usually debt for equity, is one technique for "going private." For a
critical commentary on this concept, see Address by SEC Commissioner A. Sommer, Jr., at
Notre Dame Law School, November, 1974, in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,010 at 84,692.
Its 384 F.Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In this case, Inland Credit Corporation, listed on the
American Stock Exchange, attempted to "go private" through an exchange offer to its com-
mon stockholders. Seventy percent of the outstanding common stock was held by Inland's
management and their families; the remaining 30 percent, by 1,500 public shareholders. Id.
at 1315. Inland's exchange offer invited all owners of common stock to tender their stock back
to the corporation, on a one-for-one basis, in exchange for 10 percent non-convertible subordi-
nated debentures due in 1984. Id. at 1316. In response, two shareholders moved for, and the
district court granted, a preliminary injunction restraining Inland from consummating its
exchange offer, alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) of the 1934 Act
as well as New York common and statutory law. Id. at 1314.
I Id. at 1318.
180 Id.
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presenting the shareholders with an arguably distorted view of thefacts, there is no justification for anything but the most straightfor-
ward and fullest disclosure. As such, a higher level of disclosure is
attainable without placing any unjustifiable burden upon the pur-
chasing company. 8'
Third, the issuer attempting to repurchase its own shares "is theinsider par excellence, ' ' 182 and, consequently, more rather than lessdisclosure should reasonably be expected. The district court in
Broder v. Dane, advancing this proposition, quoted from a memo-
randum submitted by the SEC during congressional hearings on the
Williams Act:
[I]t must be recognized that the disclosures which should be madeby an issuer making a tender offer for its own shares are entirelydifferent than those which should be made by a third party. For
example, an issuer making such a tender offer probably should dis-
close substantially more information with respect to its own business
and prospects than can reasonably be expected of a third party. 83
In view of the special needs of security holders in certain exchange
transactions and the variety of uses that the exchange exemption
affords, it is difficult to understand why Congress and the SEC
permit Section 3(a)(9) to continue in its present form.
State blue sky laws occasionally depart from the liberal federal
scheme, limiting the exchange exemption. California, for instance,
has a limited exchange exemption which requires that certain stock
splits and reverse stock splits be qualified under its securities act 84
and, also, denies exemption in numerous instances where a change
in the character of the outstanding shares or debt securities would
substantially and adversely affect any class of security holders. 185
Wisconsin, too, limits its exchange exemption,' but here the em-phasis is more on enhancing disclosure than on restricting the ex-
emption's applicability. The Wisconsin provision requires the issuer
" Id. at 1319.
182 Id.
"1 Id., citing Supplemental Memorandum of the SEC, in Hearings on S. 510 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 202 (1967).
"' CAL. CORP. CODE §25103 (West Supp. 1975).
185 Id.
18W is. STAT. ANN. §551.23(12)-(14) (1974).
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to file notice specifying the terms of the offer and such other infor-
mation as the securities commissioner by rule may require.'87 The
offer is then reviewed by the commissioner who may disallow the
exemption within ten days.' In states where limited exchange ex-
emptions similar to these exist,' 9 the blue sky provisions may ex-
tend protection of the public investor beyond that afforded by Sec-
tion 3(a)(9). Nevertheless, state securities provisions of the Califor-
nia and Wisconsin type still suffer problems arising from their own
peculiar approaches. The case-by-case application of California's
"substantially adverse" standard, for instance, might be so unpre-
dictable that the specter of potential litigation costs will dissuade
the would-be security holder-litigant from contesting the exchange
transaction. Likewise, no ready means exists for translating the dis-
closure of relevant information to the securities commissioner, as
required by Wisconsin, into investment-related information readily
available to and easily comprehended by the offeree.
The proposed Federal Securities Code, in preparation under the
auspices of the American Law Institute,"' also contains a counter-
part to Section 3(a)(9) which would make an exchange exemption
available only to issuers which have been continuously registered
with the SEC for a period of one year or more.19' The proposed code's
"one-year registrant" concept"' entails a shift in emphasis from
"the static disclosure concept of the 1933 Act to the continual dis-
closure concept of the 1934 Act . . -,." This shift in emphasis, in
which reasonably current information is made available to an is-
suer's security holders, results in the proposed successor provisions
I- Id §551.23(12).
I Id.
,' In addition to California, the following states limit the scope of an exemption for recapi-
talizations: Arizona, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 6134; Maine, 2 id. 22,124; Minnesota, 2 id.
26,175; Mississippi, 2 id. 27,125-1; Oregon, 3 id. 40,204; South Dakota, 3 id. 44,185,
44,193; and Vermont, 3 id. 48,104.
In addition to Wisconsin, the following states require the issuer in a recapitalization to
notify the appropriate state administrator as a condition of an exempt transaction: Alaska,
1 id. 6014; Arizona, 1 id. 6651 (administrative agency order); Arkansas, 1 id. 7114 (Rule
8 of the Exemption Policies in Arkansas requires that the notice include a description of the
method by which full disclosure of material facts will be made to each offeree, id. 7608, at
3534); Indiana, 1 id. 17,102; and Oklahoma, 2 id. 39,151 (as interpreted by Oklahoma
Securities Commission, id. 39,704, at 35,531-32).
,' See ALI, FEDERAL SECURrmIs CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972, and Rev. Draft, 1974).
,g, Id. §511(f)-(g). See id., comments at 110-14 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
, See id. §270.
" Id. § 270, comment (Rev. Draft, 1974).
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to Section 3(a)(9)'s being generally less restrictive as disclosure is
enhanced. The exclusively-in-exchange condition of Section 3(a)(9)
is dropped under the ALI proposal so that its exemptive provisions
would no longer distinguish, for instance, between rights which re-
quire cash payments and rights which require surrender of out-
standing securities.'94 Such an exemptive scheme, in the overall
context of the proposed code, makes considerable sense not only
from the standpoint of management flexibility, but also from the
predominant perspective of effective investor protection.
Until such time, however, as Congress or the SEC modifies the
current federal exchange exemption, Section 3(a)(9) will remain an
exception to the Commission's avowed commitment "to coordinate
and integrate the [continuous] disclosure system with the exemp-
tive provisions provided by [the Act].""'
"' See id. §511 (f)-(g), comment (5) at 112 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
m SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 79,617, at 83,649 (1974).
